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At first glance, Iran and the United States seem to be natural allies in the fight 
against the Islamic State. However, there has been neither military cooperation between 
the two countries in this regard nor is there evidence to suggest that the respective 
governments of these countries understand one another. In a twofold effort of increasing 
mutual understanding and filling in a gap in media content analysis, this research used 
qualitative discourse analysis to investigate the Iranian regime’s political narrative 
surrounding the Islamic State as presented by the regime-affiliated publications Kayhan 
Farsi and Kayhan English, printed in Farsi and English respectively, from 1 June 2014 to 
31 August 2014. The study found that while both Iranian regime publications advocated 
for the same political ends, they did so via different means; generally, Kayhan Farsi 
justified its stances on various issues by scapegoating the United States and Israel while 
Kayhan English favored legalistic arguments seemingly designed to persuade English 
speakers to the regime position. The harsh anti-American tone taken by the Iranian regime 
makes any counter-ISIS cooperation beyond military de-confliction appear unlikely.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In early June 2014, Islamic militants shocked the world when they swept across 
northern Iraq and subsequently declared a caliphate. Immediately, governments began to 
react. On 12 June 2014, a British source reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps Qods Forcei had already deployed a 150 man detachment to “assist Iraqi forces as 
they regroup after the catastrophic loss of Mosul and Tikrit to the Islamic State.”1 As ISIS 
began to close in on the Iran-Iraq border, more troops were sent into the fray. Al-Jazeera 
reports on 23 August that even more Iranians had crossed the border to participate in a joint 
operation with the Kurdish Peshmerga in an effort to relieve the city of Jalawla, located 30 
kilometers from Iran.2 But Iran was not the only one to commit military assets. President 
Obama had approved a small troop deployment to Baghdad by the end of June 2014. By 
mid-August 2014, the United States had kicked off a bombing campaign aimed to protect 
the autonomous Kurdish region of northeastern Iraq. To date, the United States and Iran 
have been steadily increasing their military commitments in the fight against ISIS. The two 
powers seem to be natural allies in this regard. Yet the United States and Iran see the 
conflict, and their respective commitments to it, quite differently. 
Secretary of State John Kerry articulated American support of the Iraqi government 
and their political process in public statements made 16 June.3 Kerry’s Iranian counterparts 
responded shortly after. On 17 June, a spokesperson for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs declared that the Iraqis shouldn’t expect any help from Americans, who support 
                                                 
          1 Hugh Tomlinson, “Iran’s Special Forces Rush in to Help Floundering Ally,” The 
Times, June 12, 2014, accessed April 15, 2015. http://www.thetimes.co.uk. 
          2 “Iran Sent Soldiers to Fight in Iraq” Al-Jazeera, August, 23, 2014 accessed April 15, 2015. 
http://www.aljazeera.com.  
          3 John Kerry, “Interview With Katie Couric of Yahoo!” United States Department of State, June 16, 
2014, accessed April 15, 2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/06/227624.htm. 
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ISIS and seek to meddle in the Iraqi political process.4* Another significant discrepancy 
occurred in the second week of August. A high ranking Iranian government strategic 
advisor published an editorial stating that: “The United States ignores the crimes of 
miscreant terrorist organizations currently in Iraq and Syria, and avoids calling them 
‘preferring to use terms like ‘revolutionaries’ or ‘opposition.’”5 This is in direct 
contradiction to the Obama administration which had been condemning atrocities and 
referring to these groups as “terrorists” since at least June.  In fact, the day after this 
editorial was published, the American Ambassador to the United Nations referred to 
militants in Iraq and Syria as “terrorists” three times during an address to the United 
Nations on the occasion of Security Council Resolution 2170 which condemned ISIS and 
Al-Nusrah Front.6 
Like all politicians, American and Iranian officials are under pressure to say certain 
things, even if they may not be true. Politics is rife with lies and hyperbole. But while 
political narratives may not always reflect the truth, there is value to understanding them.  
In some cases, understanding the political narrative may as important as understanding the 
truth. For instance, in 2003 President Bush accused Saddam Hussein of aiding and 
protecting terrorists, “including members of Al Qaeda,” during his State of the Union 
Address.7 This accusation was echoed by other Bush administration officials such as then 
                                                 
          4 “Amrika aameleh naa-amni dar Araaq ast [America is Responsible for Lack of Safety in Iraq],” 
June 17, 2014, Kayhan News, page 2, accessed April 15, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
          * I have personally translated all Farsi language source text used in this research and take personal 
responsibility for all translations. 
          5 Ali Akbari, “Amrika dar Araaq chi mikhaahad (What does America Want in Iraq)!?,” Kayhan 
News, 2, August 14, 2014, accessed April 15, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
          6 Samantha Powers, “Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations, after Adoption of Security Council Resolution 2170 on ISIL and the 
al-Nusrah Front in Iraq and Syria,” United States Mission to the United Nations, August 15, 2014, accessed 
April 15, 2015. http://www.usun.state.gov. 
          7 George Bush, “Text of President Bush's 2003 State of the Union Address,” The Washington Post, 
January 28, 2003, accessed April 16, 2015. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/onpolitics/transcripts/bushtext_012803.html. 
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Vice President Dick Cheney and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The claim 
was a perfect fit to the neo-conservative political narrative designed to garner public 
support for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Nevertheless, in 2007, declassified reports showed 
that the link between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda had been fabricated.8 Unfortunately, 
this was too late for the 25,000 Americans who had been killed or wounded in Iraq up to 
that point.9 Understanding this political narrative is important to understanding the Iraq 
War. Current political narratives that pertain to the current crises in Iraq and Syria are no 
different.       
In this study, I intend to clarify a less popularly understood, but no less important, 
Iranian perspective on the ISIS conflict by comparing the Iranian daily newspapers Kayhan 
Farsi and Kayhan English. I chose this topic, hoping to help fill in a gap in media research. 
While global media outlets such as the BBC and CNN have been heavily studied, few news 
outlets in the Middle East have received such attention, aside from Al-Jazeera. Of the 
already few studies that analyze Middle Eastern news outlets, most look at crisis episodes 
such as the Arab–Israeli conflict or the Iraq War. Analyzing two Kayhan* dailies, will 
diversify media research as no major research has analyzed the narratives of this outlet to 
the best of my knowledge. I chose to analyze the advent of ISIS because of the plethora of 
articles found in both Kayhan Farsi and Kayhan English on the topic; when ISIS invaded 
Iraq, both editions followed developments closely. This gave me a sufficient amount of 
data to properly analyze these Iranian versions of the ISIS story and carry out a proper 
                                                 
          8 Jeffery Smith, “Hussein's Prewar Ties To Al-Qaeda Discounted,” The Washington Post, April 6, 
2007, accessed April 16, 2015. http://www.washingtonpost.com. 
          9 “U.S. Deaths in Iraq Reach 3,000,” CNN, January 3, 2007, accessed April 16, 2014. 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/01/01/iraq.deathtoll/index.html?_s=PM:US. 
          * For the sake of brevity, when I refer to ‘Kayhan’ without specifying a particular language’s edition, 
I mean both Kayhan English and Kayhan Farsi. Both are newspapers are published daily by the Kayhan 
Institute and have the same editor, as will be discussed in a later section. 
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comparison. By conducting a cross-linguistic comparison of these two publications, I hope 
to shed light on how each one treats its target audience. 
I also chose Kayhan because the nature of the publication allowed me to control for 
certain variables. Both Kayhan publications being studied operate under strict 
governmental control, with a single editor, chosen by the Supreme Leader (more on this 
later). This eliminated the methodological difficulty of determining different editors’ 
motivations. In addition, an overwhelming majority of articles printed in each publication 
do not list an author. This eliminated the difficulty of accounting for different authors’ 
motivations when conducting analysis.  
In addition to these scholarly motives, I have chosen this topic for the following 
personal reasons: 1) I consider ISIS a global security threat and I believe that in the short-
term, defeating ISIS tactically is the most viable option for maintaining international 
security. 2) I believe that the United States and Iran are advantageously positioned to defeat 
ISIS. The existence of the Islamic State is politically intolerable for both countries. 
Additionally, both countries hold political and military influence in the region. Iran has 
shown a keen ability to project power particularly in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. In 
regard to the United States, it remains powerful despite its tarnished reputation and 
checkered history of involvement in the region. While the existence of the Islamic State 
may not be in the interest of certain other regional powers, currently, it is not politically 
feasible for any of them to take the lead against ISIS. 3) I do not believe that American 
Middle East policy-makers understand the Iranian perspective or seriously consider it when 
making decisions. This poses a significant problem as the United States and Iran increase 
their commitments respective military efforts in Iraq and Syria. Despite almost 40 years of 
enmity, a degree of cooperation – even if only at a tactical level - must occur if they are to 
eliminate the ISIS threat in a way that safeguards regional stability. Because successful 
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cooperation is impossible without mutual understanding, I hope my research can increase 
Western awareness of the little-known Iranian perspective. 
METHODOLOGY 
In this study, I use the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach within the field 
of media content analysis, to qualitatively analyze and compare key events in the ISIS 
discourse of Kayhan Farsi and Kayhan English. I have eschewed quantitative methods as 
I do not believe they are not easily lent to effectual cross-linguistic comparative studies. In 
addition, quantitative normalization would have destroyed the narrative quality of my study 
and made it less palatable for readers unfamiliar with the Iranian case, thus obviating my 
aforementioned goal of increasing Western awareness of the Iranian perspective. 
CDA is the most common approach used when conducting media analysis. This 
approach is rooted in the enlightenment idea of “reality as a human construct,”10 and more 
recently in methodologies like ‘content analysis’ and ‘discourse analysis.’ Content analysis 
is a type of media research popularized in the 1950s by researchers like Bernard Berelson 
and George Gerbner. The old-school content analyst takes text at face value and favors 
quantitative methods. For example, he or she would be more concerned with the number 
of times something was said in a text than why it was said in the first place.11 While this 
approach to media analysis has fallen out of favor, it contributed to a dialogue on the 
importance of media research and text as a unit of analysis. Discourse analysis, a more 
recent development, takes a qualitative, linguistic approach to text. Like the linguistics 
field, discourse analysis is commonly divided into the formalist and functionalist theories. 
Formalists concern themselves with sentence structure and macro linguistic patterns while 
                                                 
          10 John Hartley, Understanding News, (New York: Methuen & Co., 1982), 12. 
          11 John Richardson, Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis, (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007): 16-18. 
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functionalists deal with the “social ideas that inform the way we use and interpret 
language.”12 Functionalist discourse analysts are concerned with what language ‘means’ 
and ‘does.’ Richardson explains: “Language is used to mean [sic] things and to do [sic] 
things that relate not only to the immediate context of speaker-text-audience but also to the 
wider socio-political, political, cultural and historic contexts which bound a 
communicative act.”13 A “wider socio-political, political, cultural and historic context” is 
also a concern of CDA, which presumes a functionalist interpretation of discourse analysis. 
One sees a striking similarity between Richardson’s description of functional discourse 
analysis provided above and Fairclough and Wodak’s explanation of CDA:  
CDA uses discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of ‘social
 practice’. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship
 between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social
 structure(s), which frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but also
 shapes them.14 
 
The difference between functionalist discourse analysis and CDA is the “dialectical 
relationship” mentioned above. Analyzing this feedback loop is an essential part of CDA 
and implies that a researcher has access to a discourse and data on its target society. In 
CDA, not only does society affect discourse but discourse affects society. How media 
discourse affects racism within a society, for example, is a popular research topic in CDA 
(see van Dijk).  
                                                 
          12 John Richardson, Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis, 23. 
          13 Ibid., 25. 
          14 Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, “Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory and 
Methodology,” in Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis 2nd edition, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael 
Meyer (London: SAGE, 2009), 5-6. 
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Despite CDA’s widespread usage, it is not without critics. Tyrwhitt-Drake claims 
that it is too ideologically committed. In his view, CDA obscures truth with ideology by 
using data liberally, thus discrediting it as a methodology.15 Another critic, Philo, 
denounces the work of CDA researchers for failing to look outside of the text. He argues 
for an approach that looks not only at the content of a discourse, but also a message’s 
production and society’s reception of this message.16 These somewhat contradictory 
criticisms are indicative of the wide range of approaches that fall under the wide umbrella 
of CDA.  
I avoid the ideological commitment discussed by Tyrwhitt-Drake by sticking to the 
narrative as closely as possible. On that note, readers must keep in mind that Kayhan 
reflects deep rooted ideological positions held by the Iranian government since the Islamic 
Revolution. For instance, Iranian enmity towards the United States is not an ideology that 
I have added into the study, but an ideology articulated frequently by Iranian clerics, 
politicians, civil servants, military personnel and news outlets. In spite of Philo’s criticism 
of CDA, I avoid going beyond the text as much as possible, aside from providing a 
background of the Supreme Leader and the Kayhan Institute. Philo’s criticisms have been 
noted; I do agree that there is value to research that analyzes the production and popular 
reception of a discourse. However, this study does not do so for the following reasons. 
First, Iran is a difficult case to research. Free press does not exist in Iran and travel to this 
country can be dangerous, particularly for Westerners. Furthermore, it is difficult to access 
the Iranian people remotely due to government blockages of social media websites such as 
                                                 
          15 Hugh Tyrwhitt-Drake, "Resisting the discourse of critical discourse analysis: Reopening a Hong 
Kong Case Study," Journal of Pragmatics, 31:8, (1999): 1081–1088. 
          16 Greg Philo, “Can Discourse Analysis Successfully Explain the Content of Media and Journalistic 
Practice?,” Journalism Studies, 8:2 (2007): 175-196. 
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Facebook and Twitter,17 not to mention the fact that average citizens within the country 
may not feel comfortable candidly discussing foreign security concerns such as ISIS with 
an outsider anyway. For these reasons, it would be nearly impossible to comprehensively 
cover media production in Iran and the reception of Iranian media discourse by Iranians 
for all but the most uniquely positioned researchers. Secondly, Iranian popular opinion 
seems to matter little in government foreign policy decisions. The Islamic Republic of Iran 
has historically stifled public opinion, using violence when necessary. Although elections 
are held in Iran, they are largely a façade. The Iranian system contains a powerful, 
unelected apparatus headed by a ‘Supreme Leader’ that regularly overrides popularly 
elected officials. The Office of the Supreme Leader, which includes Kayhan publications, 
is motivated by a unique political interpretation of Shi’i Islam and implements the Supreme 
Leader’s objectives, with or without popular support.18  
Because my unit of analysis is the ISIS narrative in Kayhan, I am not concerned 
with whether or not events described in the newspaper took place. My focus is the discourse 
itself. Although this study’s organization is loosely chronological, it does not provide what 
van Dijk calls a “biography of the text.”19 Though changes in the narrative over time may 
surface, these changes are not the emphasis of the study. Nonetheless, this study does depict 
episodes over the course of a timespan longer than many other media analysis studies. 
Carvalho remarks on the dearth of large-time CDA and provides a justification for this 
approach: 
                                                 
          17 Thomas Erdbrick, “Iran Bars Social Media Again After a Day,” New York Times, September 17, 
2014, accessed November 19, 2014.http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/world/ 
middleeast/facebook-and-twitter-blocked-again-in-iran-after-respite.html?_r=0. 
          18 Wilfried Buchta, Who Rules Iran?: The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic, (Washington: 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000). 
          19 Anabela Carvalho, “Media(ted) Discourse And Society,” Journalism Studies, 9:2 (2008): 163-164. 
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Most studies of media discourse are like snapshots examining some news items in 
 detail but covering a short time span (only a day or a few days). While this may 
 be relevant for some events, most public issues have a significantly long ‘life’, 
 which is tied to representations in the media. Understanding the evolution of 
 matters such as war, terrorism or climate change, and the ways they are 
 interdependent in relation to the media, is one of the most important contributions 
 to be made by social researchers . . . . Obviously, this means a large amount of 
 work and man hours, and researchers need to devise ways to make this feasible.20 
 
Carvalho implies that large-time CDA is valuable even though it requires a “large amount 
of work and man-hours.” Later in her article, Carvalho discusses ways to reduce the amount 
of work required for producing this type of research. She recommends beginning with an 
open-ended reading of every text within the initial period of a corpus, then paring the 
amount of texts to be analyzed based on criteria developed by each individual researcher, 
e.g. their unit of analysis. Next, the researcher should analyze this reduced number of texts. 
Once they have been analyzed, the researcher should have a baseline understanding of the 
discourse. Now the researcher can reduce labor by jumping forward to “critical discourse 
moments” and documenting changes in the narrative at these crucial moments, without 
losing research quality. Carvalho describes critical discourse moments as time periods in 
which a narrative is likely to change, for example, a political scandal altering the way a 
politician is depicted in news media.21  
As for the present study, critical discourse moments are not used to reduce labor. I 
chose to include every day from 1 June 2014 to 31 August 2014 in order to ensure all 
important episodes of the narrative were considered. I did, however, follow the first two 
                                                 
          20 Carvalho, “Media(ted) Discourse And Society,” 166. 
          21 Ibid., 166. 
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stages of Carvalho’s method. I began by reviewing Kayhan Farsi and Kayhan English from 
1 June to 31 August 2014. All articles which fit into the ISIS narrative, as described below, 
were considered. 
Defining the ISIS narrative proved the most difficult part of this study. Reisigl and 
Wodak call this process “delimiting a discourse.” They acknowledge the difficulty of this 
process because, “as an analytical construct, a ‘discourse’ always depends on the discourse 
analyst’s perspective. As an object of investigation, discourse is not a closed unit, but a 
dynamic semiotic entity that is open to interpretation and continuation.”22 Since discourses 
often overlap, it is important for a researcher to untangle them in order to hone in on their 
unit of analysis. CDA researchers refer to the overlap between narratives as 
‘interdiscursivity.’ If a researcher fails to disentangle interdiscursive narratives early on, it 
could result in an impossible project due to a large amount of data covering an excessively 
wide scope. Consider the following example: a researcher wants to study ‘getting ready for 
work’ within the context of a morning routine. If the subject lays out his or her clothes for 
the following day the night before, should this be included in the discourse? What if a 
subject occasionally eats breakfast at his or her office, after arriving at work? These 
situations may or may not be included in the study, depending on the researcher’s 
perspective and how he or she chooses to delimit the data.  
The corpus of evidence for the present study consists of every article from the 
period mentioned above that explicitly mentions ISIS leadership, ISIS organizational 
                                                 
          22 Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, “The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA),” in Methods of 
Critical Discourse Analysis 2nd edition, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, (London: SAGE, 
2009), 89. 
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behavior, ISIS involvement in the current conflict and political events the occurred as a 
result ISIS activity. Articles that did not explicitly mention ISIS in these contexts were 
included based on the following three considerations:  
1. Foreign support of ISIS is an important part of the narrative. However, Kayhan 
does not always make a clear distinction between foreign support of ISIS and foreign 
support of other terrorist organizations in Syria such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and 
Al-Nusrah Front or Ba’ath party remnants in Iraq. Kayhan often lumps these groups 
together which may seem strange when considering the American perspective. In the 
United States, people generally acknowledge their country’s material support of the FSA 
but do not consider their country a supporter of ISIS, Al-Nusrah Front or remaining Ba’ath 
party elements. Should Iran see it this way? One of Iran’s few allies in the region is Syria’s 
president, Bashar Assad. But in Syria, the FSA, Al-Nusrah Front and ISIS all represent a 
similar threat to this ally. Since the FSA, Al-Nusrah Front and ISIS share a common goal 
of toppling the Assad regime, it is understandable that Kayhan might not always distinguish 
between these groups. Regarding another Iranian ally, Iraq, Kayhan associates ISIS with 
remnants of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party. Similarly, Ba’ath party elements and ISIS 
both represent a threat to Iran’s alliance with Iraq. For these reasons, Kayhan refers to 
militants belonging to all of these groups – the FSA and Al-Nusrah Front in Syria, Ba’ath 
party elements in Iraq and ISIS in both countries - as ‘terrorists,’ ‘deviants,’ ‘takfiris,’ etc., 
interchangeably. Therefore I have included any story referring to a foreign country’s 
support of unspecified ‘terrorists,’ ‘deviants,’ ‘takfiris,’ etc., in the study only if that 
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supporting country had been explicitly implicated as a supporter of ISIS at another point 
during the narrative.  
2. Kayhan depicts ISIS as part of a greater ‘Iran vs. the United States’ regional 
struggle. Disentangling this struggle from the ISIS narrative proved challenging. In 
Kayhan, ISIS is presented as a terrorist group mainly supported primarily by the United 
States and Israel. The organization is believed to be part of a greater American plot to 
subvert Iran’s regional interests by destabilizing its allies Iraq and Syria. For this reason, 
stories related to American meddling in Iraqi and Syrian politics were included in the study. 
Articles which concerned other countries mentioned in this subversion/destabilization sub-
narrative were only included if Kayhan had implicated them as a supporter of ISIS at some 
other point during the period of study. Some countries that fall into this category include 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Jordon. Accordingly, I have included articles about 
malevolent activities of these countries in the corpus.  
3. This study does not address the Iranian nuclear issue. Kayhan links the nuclear 
issue neither to America’s regional destabilization effort nor to ISIS, although America’s 
role in the nuclear issue negatively affects Iran and does appear in Kayhan throughout the 
period of analysis. While Kayhan does consider the nuclear issue a means by which the 
West attempts to subvert Iran, it does not frame the issue in a regional context; the nuclear 
issue is presented as an international one and focuses on economic sanctions. I 
acknowledge that interdiscursivity is present in Iran’s international and regional subversion 
narratives, however, including the international side of this narrative would move the 
spotlight away from ISIS and make the amount of evidence unmanageable.    
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Each Chapter will analyze the ISIS sub-narrative or narratives most reported on by 
both English and Farsi during its respective month. I have chosen this chronological 
organization in order to retain some narrative quality in this research. For example, Chapter 
two will cover June, looking at Kayhan’s perspective on the Syrian presidential elections 
sub-narrative and Sistani’s Iraqi mobilization fatwa. Chapter three will investigate 
Kayhan’s portrayal of Kurdish politics following the ISIS capture of Mosul, the most 
reported topic of July. As for Chapter four, it will examine Kayhan’s view on contention 
surrounding the August change out of the Iraqi premier.  
The next section will introduce the publications under study. I will provide a brief 
history and discuss links between the office of the Supreme Leader and Kayhan Institute, 
an organization that oversees the publication of Kayhan English and Kayhan Farsi, 
(henceforth referred to as English and Farsi, respectively). Next, I will address ideological 
similarities between the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Husseini Khamenei, and the chief 
editor of Kayhan, Hussein Shariatmadari, a perspective known as the ‘conservative right’ 
in Iran’s political parlance. 
KAYHAN AND KHAMENEI 
The dictionary definition of kayhan, directly translated, is “the space outside of 
Earth’s atmosphere and all that is in it,”23 often rendered into English as ‘galaxy’ or 
‘cosmos.’ To Westerners, this may seem an appropriate title for a newspaper whose 
perspective differs so much from their own. Although Kayhan publications may have low 
                                                 
          23 Gholamhussein Sadri-Afshar, Nasrin Hokmi and Nastaran Hokmi, Farhangeh Mo’asereh Farsi: 
Viraasteh Jadid [Contemporary Persian Dictionary: New Edition], (Tehran: Ministry of Culture and 
Islamic Guidance, 2002), 1053. 
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readership, they are well established through government funding and “[offer] insight into 
the most extreme views of Iran’s leaders and into the mind-set and plans of those who are 
at the center of power.”24 In this section, I will provide background information on the 
Kayhan Institute and its relationship to Farsi and English. I will also address these 
publications’ relationship to the office of the Supreme Leader via the director of the 
Kayhan Institute, Hussein Shariatmadari.  
Founded in 1942, Farsi was a well-respected news outlet during last three decades 
of the Pahlavi era.25 English was established in 1959 and considers itself the oldest English-
language newspaper in Iran.26 After the 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic founded the 
Kayhan Institute and brought all existing Kayhan publications, including Farsi and 
English, under its control in an effort to establish itself as the new source of cultural 
guidance for Iran.27 Today, the Kayhan Institute receives massive government subsidies 
and is managed by a personal appointee of the Supreme Leader.28 The institute oversees 
twelve publications, including Farsi and English. The various Kayhan Institute 
publications are considered to be mouthpieces of Supreme Leader Khamenei, espousing a 
political orientation described by Khiabany as one that is “in favor of total Islamization of 
public and private life in Iran, bringing all aspects of public life under Shari’a . . . they 
[persons of this persuasion] oppose liberalization policies and seek greater intervention of 
the state in the economy.”29  
                                                 
          24 Michael Slackman, “Freed by Revolution, He Speaks for Iran’s Hard-Liners,” New York Times, 
September 22, 2007, accessed April 4, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/22/world/middleeast/22shariamadari.html?_r=2. 
          25 Shapour Ghasemi, “Kayhan Newspaper,” Iran Chamber Society, 2006, accessed April 4, 2015. 
http://www.iranchamber.com/media/articles/kayhan_newspaper.php. 
          26 Gholam Khiabany, Iranian Media: The Paradox of Modernity, (New York: Routledge, 2010), 84. 
          27 Ibid., 139. 
          28 Ibid., 88. 
          29 Gholam Khiabany, Iranian Media: The Paradox of Modernity,38. 
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The Office of the Supreme Leader is the most powerful institution in the Iranian 
political system. The post is currently held by Ayatollah Khamenei who was appointed for 
life in 1989. He serves as the commander and chief of the armed forces, head of all law 
enforcement forces and has a huge support offıce with officials placed all over Iran and the 
world who report directly to him. Khamenei guides foreign policy via ‘cultural bureaus’ 
placed in Iranian embassies and domestic policy via officials placed in every provincial 
office. In addition, Khamenei directly appoints persons to positions such as the head of the 
Judiciary, President of State Radio and Television, Friday Prayer leaders across the country 
and the head of his newspaper enterprise, the Kayhan Institute.30     
The director of the Kayhan Institute and chief editor of all Kayhan publications is 
Hussein Shariatmadari. A man of the ‘Islamic’ establishment, Shariatmadari was 
imprisoned by the Shah for spreading the message of Ayatollah Khomeini before being 
freed with the advent of the Islamic Revolution. Shariatmadari then served as an Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps commander during the Iran-Iraq War.31 It is rumored that he 
also spent time working as an interrogator for the Iranian intelligence service. In 1993, 
Khamenei appointed Shariatmadari as Representative of the Supreme Leader-cum-director 
of the Kayhan Institute. The relationship between the Supreme Leader and Shariatmadari 
appears to be a close one. PBS claims that Shariatmadari “speaks for him [the Supreme 
Leader].”32 Based on a comparison of their rhetoric, this appears to be true.  
            For Khamenei, hostility towards the United States is a necessary part of Iranian 
reactionary politics. He believes that since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Islamic 
Republic has become the new target of the United States and that hostility to the country 
                                                 
          30 Buchta, Who Rules Iran: The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic, 46-51. 
          31 Slackman, “Freed by Revolution, He Speaks for Iran’s Hard-Liners.”  
          32 “Interview Hussein Shariatmadari,” PBS, August 1, 2007, accessed on April 4, 2015. 
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is imperative to the Iranian regime’s survival. Khamenei explained this in a speech given 
in 2000: 
I am quite familiar with politicians and their words as well as the motives behind 
            the propaganda of the international media. Considering this experience, I have 
            now reached the conclusion that the United States has devised a comprehensive 
            plan to subvert the Islamic system. This plan is an imitation of the plan that led to 
            the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The U.S. officials intend to carry out the 
            same plan in Iran, and there are enough clues in their selfish and often hasty 
            remarks made during the past few years indicating that they aim to do so.33 
 
In a 2003 speech at Shahid Beheshti University, Khamenei further articulated why he 
thinks that the United States wants to ‘subvert the Islamic system’:  
The primary reason for U.S. hostility toward our country is the Islamic identity of 
 our system and the fact that our Islamic system is opposed to oppression, 
 domination, dictatorship and political, economic or cultural dependence on 
 others.34  
 
Khamenei considers America’s efforts to undermine Iranian society as cultural and  
 
political, aimed at defacing Islam and creating division.35 
 
Khamenei believes that the United States designs and supports groups like Al-
Qaeda and the Taliban in order to subvert Iran’s regional interests. For Khamenei, ISIS is 
just another organization created by the United States to curb Iran’s influence. Another 
way that America challenges Iran is by dividing and discrediting Islam. Khamenei further 
explains America’s intentions in Iraq at a meeting in June 2014 with high ranking Iranian 
judiciary officials in which he criticized the United States for framing ISIS as a ‘religious 
                                                 
          33 Karim Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran’s Most Powerful Leader, 
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2009), 18. 
          34 Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran’s Most Powerful Leader, 15. 
          35 Ibid., 18. 
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organization’ and for framing the current war in Iraq as one between Sunni and Shi’i. 
Khamenei interprets this war as one between those “who want Iraq to join the American 
camp and those who want Iraq to be independent.”36 
Kayhan Institute publications support Khamenei’s views in theory and in practice. 
The following excerpt is from a 2007 interview with chief editor Shariatmadari and 
provides insight into the way Kayhan approaches politics. In the interview, Shariatmadari 
gives a lengthy explanation of Kayhan’s position regarding Islam, similar to Khamenei’s:   
We [Kayhan] believe the world order should change. It was previously 
            dominated by two poles, and then it turned to a one-superpower system, at the 
 will of the United States, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Countries must 
 have their independence, and our emphasis is the Islamic version of world order. 
 So we defend the Islamic Revolution in our country, and we view events from 
 that perspective. Within the domestic realm, we combat against ethical and 
 especially economic corruption.  We confront these issues strongly. Our emphasis 
 is maintaining the country's independence and defending it against those people 
 and those states that seek to deprive it of that independence. We attach a great 
 deal of importance to having a government in the country that is based on the will 
 of the people, and one that functions, of course, within the Islamic rubric.37 
 
In other public pronouncements, Shariatmadari continues this line of rhetoric.  In 2013, he  
 
called the “death to America” protest slogan part of Iranian identity, going on to say that:  
 
We are in a struggle of identities with America and the autocratic system of 
 government.  Our identities are grappling with one another. We will remain in this 
 struggle as long as we defend Islam and they insist on defending tyranny. There 
 are only two situations in which the struggle will end: either we turn away from 
 the pure Islam of Mohammad or they turn away from tyranny.38 
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Shariatmadari’s ‘identity struggle’ lines up nicely alongside Khamenei’s beliefs regarding  
 
Iran’s  cultural  struggle  with  the  United  States.  Both  believe  that  America represents 
 
tyranny;  it   subverts  Islam  and   Iranian    culture.   Iran represents   Islam,    which     is  
 
fundamentally opposed to tyranny and Western cultural subversion.  
In this section, I have demonstrated the importance of the Supreme Leader in 
Iranian politics and his relationship to the Kayhan Institute. I have also shown parallels 
between political perspectives held by the Supreme Leader and his representative at the 
institute, Hussein Shariatmadari. This historical-political setup should enable the reader to 







Chapter 2: Syrian Elections and Iraqi Mobilization, June 2014 
This section will compare English and Farsi’s depictions of the Syrian Presidential 
Elections and Sistani’s Fatwa, both important sub-narratives in Kayhan’s approach to ISIS. 
These two sub-narratives were chosen because they received more attention than any other 
ISIS-related topic during the period of study. Within each sub-narrative, Farsi will be 
analyzed first, followed by English. 
THE SYRIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
The Syrian presidential elections, held on 3 June 2014, were framed by Farsi as a 
pivotal moment in the Syrian government’s security struggle against ISIS. In this sub-
narrative, Farsi went a step further than English by using the Syrian elections to highlight 
the importance of democracy in combating terrorists and proclaiming the victory of Bashar 
Assad as a defeat of Western plots. Although English also declared Assad’s electoral 
victory a catalyst for the ‘ISIS defeat’ in Syria, it emphasized different aspects of the sub-
narrative and painted a less hopeful picture for the country.  
Two days before the elections took place, Farsi published an article covering the 
Friends of Syria Conference in Tehran. It included many public statements made by those 
in attendance. For example, the Speaker of Parliament, Ali Larijani, voiced support of the 
democratic process as a solution to the Syrian crisis. The article highlighted a portion of 
Larijani’s speech where he commends the tenacity of the Syrian people. The article also 
featured remarks by the Iranian Foreign Minister, Muhammad Javad Zarif, who echoed 
Larijani’s support of the Syrians and added that Iran is ready to send humanitarian aid to 
Syria.39 Farsi furthered these positions in an election-day article, that emphasized the 
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following: 1) the Syrian people are aware that their presence at the polls will foil Western 
plots, 2) Syrian security forces have ensured the safety of the polling stations, and 3) many 
people, including the Syrian ‘ulama and American analysts, predict an Assad victory.40 In 
the days that followed, Farsi emphasized the legitimacy of the elections, the elections as a 
defeat of the West, the importance of Assad’s victory for Syria and Iran’s support of the 
Syrian government. Farsi printed numerous official statements concerning these topics 
during the post-election period.  
On 7 June 2014, Farsi reported comments made by the head of an Iranian election 
monitoring commission sent to Syria, Ala’al-Din Borujerdi. During a meeting with the 
Syrian President, Borujerdi stated that America and the West were afraid of the Syrian 
elections. 41  He went on to congratulate Syrian leadership, further stating that these 
elections were a victory for the Syrian people, the nation of Iran and all of those who stand 
by Syria. In addition, he pledged Iranian support to Syria during their reconstruction 
period.42 A pair of articles appear on 9 June 2014 that describe the Iranian President and 
parliament’s congratulations to Syria, respectively. In the first article, President Hassan 
Rouhani congratulated Syrians in a letter to Assad for successfully carrying out their 
presidential election, an election which Rouhani considered a victory for the Syrian people. 
Rouhani continued: “The election results show the confidence of Syrian people, and their 
dedication to stability, safety and national unity.”43 The second article discussed 
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parliamentary support in a similar statement signed by 230 representatives. Farsi 
highlighted a portion of this statement critical of the United States: 
The success of the Syrian electoral process demonstrated the power of this 
 government and its people in the face of the scheming Americans and their allies. 
 By voting for Bashar Assad, the Syrian nation strengthened the league of peace 
 loving countries who are against the war in Syria, and neutralized the plots of 
 America and other enemies.44 
English briefly mentioned the Syrian elections on 1 June 2014 in a front page article 
about terrorist atrocities in Syria. Near the end of the article, it stated: “Terrorist outfits 
have recently stepped up their brutal attacks on civilians in several cities and towns as Syria 
prepares to hold an important presidential election on June 3 [sic].”45 This is a sharp break 
with the Farsi sub-narrative; in Farsi we find nothing correlating an upsurge in terrorist 
activity with the presidential elections. In fact, Farsi does not mention violence in Syria at 
all during this period, instead dwelling on the safety of the country on the eve of the 
elections.46 Another break between the two narratives occurred in the publications’ 
discussion of ‘election legitimacy.’ While Farsi only mentioned the elections’ legitimacy 
in passing, English dedicated an entire article to the topic. The primary source of this report 
was remarks made by Bouthaina Shaaban, an advisor to Bashar Assad. Shaaban’s 
statement sums up the article nicely: “I would like to say to all western [sic] officials who 
say they will not acknowledge it [election legitimacy] – gone are days when legitimacy 
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was derived from the West. The West has no right to give our people legitimacy. It is the 
Syrian people who make this election legitimate.”47  
Regarding the Friends of Syria Conference, a 2 June 2014 story found in English 
about the event was similar to the one found in Farsi. Both articles emphasized the 
importance of the democratic process in Syria, as reflected in the titles, “Friends of Syria 
Back Elections”48 and “Solution to Syrian Crisis Rests in Ballot Box,”49 in English and 
Farsi respectively. English covered Iranian officials’ post-election congratulations as well, 
although the topic received much less attention. A small front page article remarked on the 
Iranian parliament’s 8 June statement lauding the Syrian people for holding successful 
elections.50 
In addition to coverage of the election itself, both publications reported on the 
elections’ after effects. Farsi reported the elections as a defeat for ISIS and Western plots 
in Syria. An article published in Farsi entitled, “The Messages of the Syrian Elections,” 
explains:  
The current President was the best choice for the Syrian people. The participation 
 of more than 83% of Syrians, 88% of which cast their vote for Assad, was a stern 
 response to the claimers of freedom and democracy [the West]. These hypocrites 
 have destabilized the country [Syria] for over three years by sending thousands of 
 terrorists and the most advanced weaponry.51 
 
The article continues, discussing the defeat of Western plots:  
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As expected, the West and its allies, who have all taken a belligerent stance 
 towards the people of this country [Syria], were apprehensive about the 
 Presidential elections. The anti-Syrian axis knew that widespread Syrian 
 participation in the election would foil their plots, the most important of which was 
 the removal of the Assad regime.52 
 
Additionally, Farsi began publishing articles during this period reporting the defeat of ISIS 
 
in Syria, caused by successful elections, as the reason for the group’s attack on Iraq. 
 
English also reported that ISIS was defeated in Syria so the group decided to attack 
Iraq. Unlike Farsi however, English did not cite ‘successful presidential elections’ as a 
catalyst for the defeat, remaining vague on this point. On 14 June 2014, English quoted 
Iranian Basij commander, General Muhammad Reza Naqdi, who said that ISIS is a proxy 
of the United States operating under orders. According to the article, the commander 
“implied that Western agents were behind the recent ISIS strikes in Iraq, including taking 
the city of Mosul.”53 According to the article, General Naqdi believed that America and 
the West will regret their decision to attack Iraq and that America was defeated in its failure 
to topple Bashar Assad. As he explained, “America has been tricked again, thinking that 
with the games it has started in Iraq it can continue its rotten . . . policies in the region.”54  
Lastly, Farsi coverage explored the implications of the Assad victory for Iran’s 
geopolitical situation, a topic that did not appear in English. A pair of Farsi articles, 
published on 8 June, shed light how the Syrian election relates to Iran’s regional self-image. 
The first article, entitled “The Islamic Republic has Brought America to its Knees in the 
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Region,” is a summary of alleged Western reports on Iranian diplomatic success against 
American Middle East policy. The article states that Iran has ‘the upper hand’ in the region 
due in part to its successful support of the Assad regime, citing a piece allegedly printed in 
the New York Times.55 The second article, which alleged to be based on a Saudi television 
news report, described the Syrian election as a demonstration of Iranian regional power. 
According to the Saudi source, the balance of power in the Middle East will not change as 
long as Tehran supports Damascus, despite Western assistance to insurgents. This source 
reminds us that the West and their Arab allies sought to overthrow the Syrian regime within 
a few months, however, the fact that three years later the Assad regime was able to hold 
elections legitimized the Syrian government.56  
GRAND AYATOLLAH ALI SISTANI’S FATWA 
As the Iraqi government reeled from the ISIS capture of Mosul, Iraq’s top Shi’i 
cleric took action. At a prayer service on Friday, 13 June 2014, Grand Ayatollah Ali 
Sistaniii issued a fatwa calling for Iraqis to mobilize and fight against ISIS. Farsi and 
English followed these events closely and considered the Fatwa an important agent in the 
Iraqi effort. More specifically, Farsi considered the Fatwa a major factor contributing to 
the Iraqi people’s mobilization and alleged tactical success against ISIS. Farsi also reported 
the Fatwa’s universal acceptance by important religious and political figures. Meanwhile, 
English de-emphasized support of the fatwa. Although the publication did consider the 
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Fatwa a motivator in the subsequent troop mobilization, English reported more limited 
Iraqi tactical success against ISIS than Farsi did and refrained from linking reported 
tactical success directly to the Fatwa.  
Because Kayhan is not published on Fridays, the Islamic day of rest, its coverage 
of the Fatwa did not begin until the following day, 14 June 2014. On this day, Farsi covered 
a phone conversation about the situation in Iraq that took place between President Rouhani 
and Iraqi Premier Nouri al-Maliki. During the conversation, Rouhani remarked on Sistani’s 
fatwa: “The noble Shi’i religious authority Ayatollah Sistani’s announcement that all must 
unite in the battle against terrorists will play an important role in Iraqi mobilization and 
resistance against terrorist killings and crimes.”57 Farsi continued reporting on the 
important role played by the fatwa throughout the remainder of June 2014. 
Farsi reported the fatwa’s immediate effect. On the same day as Rouhani’s 
remarks, a back page article entitled “Mobilization Across Iraq in the Fight Against ISIS 
Terrorists” stated: “The Iraqi people accept the religious edict [Sistani’s Fatwa] and enter 
battle against ISIS alongside the Iraqi Army.”58 The article went on to emphasize cross-
country fervor to volunteer. It quoted an Iraqi commander in charge of operations near 
Samarra, Sabah al-Fatlawi, who said that: “About 1.5 million people from all over Iraq 
have volunteered to fight ISIS.”59 Later on, the article printed exerts from the Fatwa. In it, 
Sistani said that anyone who can lift a weapon must join the Iraqi security efforts, adding 
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that anyone who dies fighting against ISIS will be considered a martyr.60 Similar coverage 
continues for the next six days. 
On 15 June 2014, Farsi published two articles regarding Sistani’s Fatwa. The first, 
highlighted Iraqi clerical support of Sistani’s Fatwa. This short piece revealed that 
Ayatollah Qazvini, the Friday Imam of the Imam Hussein shrine in Karbala, led Friday 
prayers wearing combat fatigues and holding a weapon. In his sermon, he called on the 
people to stand with the Iraqi Army and destroy ISIS in accordance with Sistani’s decree 
ordering jihad.iii He went on to say that ISIS is targeting every province, including the 
religiously significant Najaf and Karbala.61 The second 15 June 2014 article mentioned the 
religiously motivated mobilization of Iraqis in the face of ISIS amid a discussion of the 
disposition of Iraqi forces and ISIS militants. The article concluded with a list of influential 
clerics who support Sistani’s Fatwa, including the President of the Supreme Islamic 
Council of Iraq, Ammar al-Hakim, and Grand Ayatollah Bashir Najafi.62 In regard to the 
quotations above, two points are worth noting. First, the ‘volunteers’ obeying Sistani’s 
Fatwa do not necessarily join the Iraqi security forces. As seen in both Qazvini’s statement 
and Farsi’s characterization, volunteers are referred to as an entity separate from the Iraq 
military that organized into, literally, ‘people’s forces,’iv a term which I have rendered into 
English in this study as ‘paramilitary force.’ This characterization held true throughout the 
Sistani fatwa sub-narrative found in Farsi. Secondly, Farsi not only reported on Shi’i 
clerics who supported the Sistani Fatwa, but on Sunni leaders who called for mobilization 
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against ISIS, as the newspaper tries more and more to discredit Islamic State as a religious 
movement. 
For example, in the latter part of June Farsi began to frame the religious decree not 
only as the impetus for popular Iraqi mobilization but as an agent which turned the tide of 
the war. In the following exert, taken from 16 June 2014, Farsi referenced Sistani’s Fatwa 
and Sunni leaders: 
Paramilitary forces [literally, ‘people’s forces’] and the Iraqi Army halt the
 advance of ISIS towards Baghdad and have uprooted the group from many areas.
 The entry of tens of thousands of paramilitary forces into the fray has completely
 turned the tide of the war within the last 24 hours; people responding to appeals by 
 the leading Shi’i religious authority [Sistani] and Sunni ulama have taken up arms, 
 and forced ISIS mercenaries to retreat in many areas.63  
 
Farsi coverage over the next few days emphasized the universal support of Sistani’s Fatwa.  
 
For example, on the 18 June  2014  it reported  that United Nations Secretary General Bon  
 
Ki Moon “welcomes Ayatollah Sistani’s Fatwa regarding Iraqi unity.”64 The following day  
 
featured  two  articles that  reference  the  Fatwa. In the  first, a  representative of  the  Al- 
 
Marashdeh  tribe of Iraq  said that he  had accepted  Sistani’s call  for jihad  and had  begun  
 
organizing  tribal  fighters.65  The second  article  featured  comments  by the  Iraqi Premier,   
 
Nouri Al-Maliki, “Sistani’s Fatwa strengthened our will to fight against ISIS.”66  
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The final explicit mention of the fatwa in Farsi during the period of study comes 
on 28 June 2014. After summarizing tactical successes by the Iraqi Army and popular 
militia forces across Iraq, the article adverted to the fatwa: “A fatwa issued by the ranking 
Shi’i religious authority [Sistani] blindsided ISIS terrorists who had occupied sections of 
northern Iraq since 9 June 2014. ISIS are pulling out of more and more occupied areas by 
the day.”67 A week before this article, two others appeared that alluded to remarkable 
successes in mobilization. On 22 June, 2014 an article was printed by Farsi carrying the 
headline “Two Million Iraqis Join Intense Battle Against ISIS Infidels” which chronicled 
Iraqi tactical and recruiting success.68 The next day, Farsi printed a similar article that 
stated: “. . . the number of volunteers in the fight against ISIS terrorists has grown so much 
so that the total exceeds 2.5 million.”69 Within the context of this sub-narrative, the sharp 
uptick in volunteers reported by Farsi in these two articles appeared to be linked to the 
fatwa. 
Two themes appeared in Farsi’s reporting on the Fatwa sub-narrative. First, the 
Fatwa is universally accepted - from the Iranian President, to Iraqi clerics, to the Iraqi 
people, to the United Nations Secretary General. Secondly, the Fatwa resulted in 
widespread mobilization, especially of paramilitary forces. As mentioned above, Farsi’s 
Iraqi military source reports 1.5 million volunteers by the day after the Fatwa. Within ten 
days of the Fatwa, the number of volunteer fighters was reported at over 2.5 million. 
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English also considered Sistani’s Fatwa a key factor in Iraqi mobilization. On the 
whole, the Iraqi mobilization numbers reported in English are similar to those found in 
Farsi, although they appeared on different days throughout the month. For example, 
English did not report 1.5 million volunteers until 15 June 2014.70 Farsi presented this 
statistic on 14 June, the day after the Fatwa. English reported two million volunteers on 18 
June while Farsi did not report the figure until 22 June 2014. Remarkably, the two million 
figure appears in English for the first time on the weekly “Children’s Corner” page near 
the end of an article entitled “Time to Wipe Out Terrorists from Iraq”:  
These hordes of Lucifer [ISIS] have even threatened to desecrate the holy shrines           
 of the Imams of the Prophet’s Household, if they manage to enter the sacred cities 
 of Karbala,Najaf, Kazemayn in Baghdad, and Samarra. However, thanks to the 
 fatwa issued by Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Sistani, around two million Iraqis 
 including Sunni Muslims, encouraged by the edicts of their clerics, have rallied to 
 the defence of Baghdad. This united force is beginning to drive back the cowardly 
 Takfiris. 71 
 
This was not the last time  that English  reported  the  number. It appeared again the next  
day72 and on 22 June 2014, the same day Farsi released the figure, and the day. Unlike 
Farsi, English does not emphasize the Fatwa’s universal acceptance. English featured only 
one article on this topic, published 25 June 2014 which said that “Iran’s Qom seminary 
school, an influential theological school of Islamic learning, has praised Iraqi top Shia 
cleric Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali al-Sistani’s religious decree, urging Iraqis to protect the 
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country’s holy shrines against terrorist attacks by ISIL.”73 The same 25 June 2014 article 
again cited the ‘two million’ figure. Here we see a discrepancy as Farsi had placed the 
number of Iraqi volunteers at over 2.5 million two days before. 
CONCLUSION 
Two trends emerged in our respective publication’s coverage of these episodes. 
First, Farsi gave a more hopeful description of events than English. For example, English 
reported an uptick in terrorist attacks during the build up to the Syrian elections,74 whereas 
Farsi emphasized the security of voting sites.75 In the Sistani Fatwa sub-narrative, Farsi 
focused on the Fatwa’s universal acceptance and linked the Iraqi security forces’ tactical 
success to the Fatwa, whereas English did not. If one includes Farsi’s final mobilization 
figures as part of the Fatwa sub-narrative, we see a larger number of volunteers in Farsi by 
the end of the month than in English.  
Secondly, Farsi put more emphasis on ‘people’ as an agent in the ISIS struggle than 
English. According to Farsi, the Syrian people were aware that their votes would foil 
Western plots.76 The Syrian people were also mentioned frequently in congratulatory 
statements to Assad reported by Farsi. English mentioned the Syrian people only once, in 
a small article that quoted the Iranian parliament’s post-election statement.77 The Iraqi 
people received similar treatment by Farsi. Throughout Farsi’s Fatwa sub-narrative, 
‘people’s forces’ were referred to as separate from Iraqi security forces. In Farsi, ‘people’s 
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forces’ organized and served alongside the Iraqi Army, not in it. English does not make 
such a distinction; it only mentioned Iraqi security forces in the fight against ISIS.  
While the narratives of English and Farsi are generally the same, the trends 
identified above suggest that English makes a deliberate effort to speak to a Western 
audience. For example, English chose to dedicate an entire article to the legitimacy of the 
Syrian elections, whereas in Farsi, election legitimacy was mentioned in passing or 
implied. At the time of the Syrian presidential elections, the general consensus in the 
English speaking world was the elections were a fraud. Perhaps English published an entire 
article on the topic to challenge this Western assumption and attempt to convince 
Westerners otherwise. Farsi assumed the elections were healthy, an indication that its 
domestic audience did not need to be convinced. In regard to the Fatwa sub-narrative, 
English does not make a distinction between ‘people’s forces’ and the Iraqi security forces. 
Anglophone countries, generally, view armed civilian militias in a negative light. 
Therefore, had English reported the ‘people’s forces’ as a separate component of Iraqi 
mobilization, the Fatwa sub-narrative would have been less palatable for Western readers. 
Farsi faced no such issue. The publication’s depiction of volunteers as a separate entity 
harkens back to the Basij mobilizations of the Iran-Iraq War. ‘People’s forces’ fighting 
alongside regular forces is a concept that Iranian readers know well. 
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Chapter 3: Kurdish Politics, July 2014 
Kayhan reporting in July was dominated by political developments in the semi-
autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Early failures by the divided Maliki 
government to quell the ISIS advance led to action by President Masoud Barzani of the 
KRG, namely, his orders to the Peshmergav to seize of oilfields around Kirkuk and the 
decision to hold a referendum on KRG independence from Iraq. These developments 
caused much friction between the KRG and the Iraqi central government and were followed 
closely by Kayhan. For its part, Farsi interpreted these actions as treacherous; Barzani was 
portrayed as a traitor who supported ISIS, directly opposed the will of the Iraqi people and 
knowingly pursued the goals of the United States and Israel - two countries Farsi alleged 
to have created ISIS and that sought to partition Iraq. To support these claims, Farsi 
focused on the disunifying nature of Barzani’s decisions to sieze Kirkuk and hold a 
referendum, the support the KRG received from enemies of the Shi’i ‘resistance front’vi 
and how actions taken by the KRG forwarded an American/Israeli plot to partition Iraq. 
English took a similar but less direct approach, stopping short of calling the KRG an 
American/Israeli proxy.  
I have divided Farsi’s Kurdish politics sub-narrative into three different topics, 
analyzed in three respective subsections. The first looks at the publication’s take on the 
alleged ‘American/Israeli partition plot,’ along with the Barzani’s role in it. The next 
analyzes Farsi reporting on those persons in favor of the Kurdish independence and 
partition. The final subsection looks at those who were against it. After analyzing Farsi’s 
portrayal of the sub-narrative, I’ll compare it to the English version. The English portion 
will focus mostly on the publication’s portrayal of the ‘American/Israeli partition plot’ 
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since its reporting is essentially the same regarding those in favor of and against Barzani’s 
actions.  
A pair of articles appearing on 3 and 12 July 2014 respectively, give an in-depth 
look at Farsi’s perspective on what it considered an ‘American/Israeli plot.’ The first, 
entitled “The ISIS Fantasy,” stated that the United States and Israel formed ISIS in order 
to target Iran’s ‘resistance front’ and other interests in the region. The article framed 
‘partition’ as part of an American/Israeli strategy aimed at weakening Iran by undercutting 
a unified Iraq, a key member of the ‘resistance front,’ and thus strengthening Israel’s 
position in the region.78 The second article, entitled “The Zionists’ Dream for Kurdish 
Iraq,” explored Farsi’s view on Israel’s relationship to partition, in depth: 
From the Israelis’ perspective, the fact that Kurds are scattered across the region 
makes taking advantage of them useful and simple. The Israelis’ even believe that 
 forming an independent Kurdistan is a sort of ‘strategic investment and balance for 
 Israel.’ On the topic, Ofra Bengio says that ‘forming an independent Kurdistan 
 would weaken numerous countries with a history of enmity with Israeli such as 
 Iraq, Syria and Iran.’ They [Israelis] believe that a Kurdistan formed within the 
 heart of the resistance front can act as a dagger in the heart of those nations in the 
 region who support the front.79 
 
Comments made by the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab-African Affairs Amir- 
 
Abdollahian also clear up the Farsi perspective: “The Iranian Foreign Ministry Deputy for 
 
Arab-African Affairs considered the partition of Iraq a Zionist project, saying that ‘We will  
 
never allow Netanyahu’s (Prime Minister of the Zionist regime) dream to come true.’”80 In  
 
addition, Amir-Abdollahian encouraged Barzani not to violate the constitution, a move that  
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would be “in no one’s interest.” He went on: “We [the Iranian government] will not support  
 
partition, in the same way that all people of Iraq - including Shi’is and Sunni’s, Kurds and  
 
Arabs – will not support partition; we are strongly in favor of territorial unity in Iraq.”81 
 
In addition to explaining the partition plot, Farsi reported on which countries 
supported it, while using feature articles and quotations to frame Barzani as an enabler of 
the plot. Farsi alleged that his decisions to sieze oil rich Kirkuk and hold an independence 
referendum appeared to have a disunifying effect on Iraq and were the first steps in the 
realization of an American/Israeli partition plot. For example, a 1 July  2014article reported 
that Barzani not only wanted Prime Minister Maliki to step down but implied that the KRG 
is a foreign proxy: “. . . the Zionist regime, the United States, and even Turkey are talking 
of partitioning Iraq; Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of the Zionist Regime, 
officially announced that he will help Iraqi Kurds achieve independence.”82 Emphasizing 
the United States as a supporter of partition, another article cited an anonymous American 
analyst who allegedly stated that the United States seeks the partition of Iraq.83 Both the 
United States and Israel are implicated on 12 July 2014 as Farsi exposed discourse between 
Israeli politicians, who favor partition, and their American counterparts:  
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Israel has concluded that now is the time for Kurdistan to separate from Baghdad. 
 This is exactly the same sentiment that Avigdur Liberman, the Zionist Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs, communicated to his counterpart John Kerry. This is the same 
 attitude that Shiman Perez, the President of Israel, shared in his letter to Barak 
 Obama, President of the United States.84 
 
The  aforementioned  articles  have  powerful  implications  in  a  publication  that  openly  
 
accused Isreal and the United States of creating ISIS and chaotic the situation that enabled  
 
Barzani  to  take  actions  toward   partition.   These  articles  taken   in  conjunction   with  
 
accusations  by Maliki described below,  shed  light on the true depth of Barzani’s  alleged  
 
treachery. 
Prime Minister Maliki, who made some of the most damning accusations against 
Barzani, was among the myriad of regional politicians and pundits Farsi cited throughout 
the month who opposed the KRG’s provocations and an independent Kurdistan. On the 
same day of a feature article describing “the partition of Iraq” and “an independent 
Kurdistan” as ISIS priorities,85 Maliki implicated Barzani as a facilitator of ISIS: 
“Unfortunately, now I must say that the capital of the Kurdish region, Arbil, has been 
transformed into a center for ISIS, former Ba’ath party members and Al-Qaeda 
terrorists.”86 This statement came as no surprise considering days later Farsi reported that 
Maliki had dimissed Kurdish cabinet members and halted Baghdad – Arbil flights.87  The 
same article accused the KRG of selling oil in northern Iraq without the permission of 
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Baghdad, despite an ongoing ‘land dispute’ - refering to the KRG’s continued possession 
of the Kirkuk oilfields.88 Citing yet another of Barzani’s efforts to disunify Iraq, the piece 
stated that he had ordered the digging of a defensive channel across northern Iraq in order 
to protect the KRG from terrorists. Also mentioned, was Barzani’s intent to hold an 
independence referendum against the will of the Iraqi people.89  
Other public figures were reported to have spoken out against Barzani’s 
incitements. For example on 1 July 2014, Amir-Abdollahian dismissed the idea of a 
referendum and the notion of partition: “The wise Iraqi-Kurdish leaders are not seeking 
autonomy and remain bound to the constitution of the country [Iraq] . . . those who speak 
of partitioning Iraq are not considering the consequences of such an action.”90 A 5 July 
2014 article, mentioned other politicians who opposed independence and partition: 
Salih Muslim, the leader of Syrian Kurds, announced that he also does not support 
 the disunion of Iraqi Kurds. In Baghdad, Iskandar Watoot, a parliament
 representative belonging to the State of Law coalition, said that Kirkuk will never
 belong to Kurdistan. Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari [an ethnic Kurd] said that
 Kurds and Sunnis cannot and must not order Shi’is around. 91  
 
The article also asserted that  because an  independent  Iraqi  Kurdistan  does not have the  
 
support of its neighbors partition is not feasible:  
One must tell those who talk about Barzani’s recent statements regarding the 
 independence referendum that even he himself knows [partition] is not practicable 
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 . . . Iraqi political parties, factions, and Kurds must be aware that this is not a good 
 time for political turf wars.92  
Finally, Farsi places Barzani at odds with the Iraqi people. Quoting a spokesperson 
for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a 6 July 2014 article stated: “The Iraqi 
constitution has the capacity to secure the needs of all people in the country and we have 
no doubt that all Iraqis seek to protect the unity of Iraq. The people of Iraq will never 
concede to partition of their country.”93  
Unlike Farsi, English never fully explained the partition plot – but it did make 
oblique references to it. As seen in the following examples, while English did portray the 
KRG’s seizure of Kirkuk and Barzani’s desired referendum as treacherous and did 
highlight foreign support of the KRG’s actions, it did not accuse directly accuse Barzani 
of carrying out a foreign plot. 
On 1 July 2014, English ran an article summarizing the situation and emphasizing 
an overt link between Israel and the KRG:  
Lawmakers in Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region have welcomed Zionist 
 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s call for the creation of an independent
 Kurdish state. Mardan Khadr Zebary, a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
 (PDK), thanked Netanyahu on Sunday, saying the Kurdistan region and Israel face 
 the same enemies. Bayar Tahir Dosky, also from the PDK, said the Zionist
 premier’s call made them happy, as he tried to ‘support us and give the Kurds and 
 Kurdistan their rights.94 
 
The  article  went on  to  mention  the KRG  seizure  of the Kirkuk  oilfields  and  highlight  
 
tension between the central government and the KRG: 
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Kurdish forces took control of Kirkuk after Iraqi troops entered a battle with the so 
 called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) earlier this month. The latest 
 developments come as tensions have been ratcheted up between Kurdistan’s 
 regional leaders and the central government in Baghdad. The Iraqi government has 
 repeatedly slammed the Kurdistan region for exporting oil without Baghdad’s 
 consent. Baghdad says it has the sole right to export the country’s crude, but the 
 Kurds say they are entitled to market the resources of their own region.95  
English put much more stress on Netenyahu’s support of an “independent Kurdish 
state” than Farsi did, however, it took a much less nuanced approach to the issue; English 
repeated the same talking points in almost the exact same fashion numerous times 
throughout the month. Nearly every article in English regarding the KRG or Barzani 
mentioned Netanyahu’s support of an independent Kurdistan and KRG contentedness with 
his support. Whereas Farsi explained this support as part of an Israeli led plot to partition 
Iraq, English did not make such a connection, although it left room for a reader to assume 
as much. For the sake of brevity, of the more than a dozen articles that mentioned the Israel-
KRG link only three are referenced here.  
In the first, the Israeli pro-partition stance is juxtaposed against the Turkish 
position. After quoting Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister, who was not in favor of KRG 
independence, the article stated: “Netanyahu expressed support for the potential separation 
of the Kurdistan region from Iraq. . . . Lawmakers in Kurdistan region [sic] welcomed the 
comments by Netanyahu.”96 In the next example, printed a few days later, an article 
focusing mostly on Barzani’s alleged opportunism mentioned that: “Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu also has supported the creation of an independent Kurdistan state.”97 
The final example comes near the end of the month, as is seen in the final sentence of an 
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article on KRG oil exports: “The Zionist regime was the first foreign regime to welcome 
an independent Kurdistan.”98  
English held a position similar to Farsi’s in regards to KRG treachery. Like Farsi, 
it portrayed Barzani and KRG politicians as traitors against the Iraqi central government, 
citing as proof, their support of ISIS, as well as their provocative actions suggestive of 
partition. Unlike Farsi, however, English did not openly state that Barzani was working 
toward the goals of foreign governments. English’s reporting only subtly implied this, 
using public statements by Iraqi political figures accusing the KRG of supporting ISIS and 
constantly highlighting foreign, particularly American and Israeli, support of ISIS and the 
KRG.vii Since both Farsi and English openly claimedviii that ISIS was created and is 
supported by the United States and Israel, one could infer from English reporting on how 
the KRG assists ISIS, that the KRG is at the least complicit in the foreign plot to partition 
Iraq and at most operates as an American/Israeli proxy. The following two pairs of articles 
provide evidence for this supposition.  
In a 6 July 2014 article, English presented the viewpoint of an Iraqi politician 
hostile to the KRG: “An Iraqi parliamentarian has accused the president of Iraq’s Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG) of ‘treason’ against the central government during the 
overrun of the northern city of Mosul by the Takfir Takfiri [sic] group [ISIS].” Quoting the 
Iraqi parliamentarian, English wrote: “According to our accurate information, Masoud 
Barzani was involved in a treachery that helped the ISIL insurgents overrun Iraq’s second 
largest city last month.” The following day, an article about Iran’s position regarding the 
new Iraqi Prime Minister weighs in on the KRG question: “The ISIL offensive, which led 
Iraqi troops to abandon their posts, has emboldened Kurdish leaders to press for 
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independence of their autonomous northern region. Tehran opposes a break up of Iraq, 
denouncing it as an Israeli plot.”99 The first article, featured a politician that unequivocally 
accused the KRG of enabling ISIS to overrun Mosul while the second highlighted ISIS as 
an agent whose actions emboldened the KRG to “press for independence.” These types of 
articles, taken together, emerged as more subtle version of Farsi’s portrayal of the 
‘partition plot.’  
For the second example, a pair of articles that appeared on 10 and 14 July 2014 will 
be analyzed. The first, reported on a public statement made by the Iraqi premier in which 
he openly accused the KRG of treachery: 
Prime Minister Nuri [sic] al-Maliki on Wednesday accused the Northern [sic]
 autonomous Kurdish region of hosting terrorists spearheading an offensive that has 
 overrun swathes of territory and sparked Iraq’s worst crisis in years. ‘Honestly, we 
 cannot be silent over this and we cannot be silent over Arbil being a headquarters
 for Daash (i.e. ISIL), and Baath, and Al-Qaeda and terrorist operations.’100 
 
The second article, quoted a political analyst who stated that: “The United States supports  
 
formation  of an  independent  Kurdish  state to  use  the  entity  to undermine  Iraq’s central  
 
government.”101  The  analyst  went  on  to  point  out  who  would  most  benefit  from  the  
 
fragmentation of Iraq:  
Foreign powers, including the US, are keen to recognize an independent Kurdish 
 state. The Americans want to use it as a weapon against the central government. 
 They are threatening the central government that the Kurdish region might do it 
 alone and go outside Iraq.102  
As with the previous example, English does not explicitly accuse the KRG of acting as a  
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foreign proxy, but it does leave room for a reader to reach this conclusion. If the KRG and  
 
the United States/Israel support ISIS, and the United States/Israel seek to divide Iraq, could  
 
it  be more than a  coincidence that  the KRG is  creating chaos  and  seeking  independence?  
 




It is unremarkable that an Iranian regime publication would take a stance against 
any empowerment of Kurds in a neighboring country, considering the tenuous relationship 
the regime has with its own Kurds. What is remarkable, however, is the different 
approaches the publication took in regard to reporting such an issue to its respective 
language audiences. While both editions took a tough line against Barzani, unsurprisingly, 
Farsi took a harsher tone than English. In English, Barzani was a traitor who supported 
ISIS to weaken the government of Iraq whereas in Farsi he is an agent of the United States 
and Israel consciously acting towards their goal to partition Iraq. Farsi demonstrated this 
by contextualizing Barzani’s actions within an alleged ‘American/Israeli partition plot’ and 
it while highlighting links between the KRG and the United States/Israel. English did 
highlight such links, particularly ones with Israel, although it neither explained nor 
contextualized the links within a greater partition plot. Instead, English only alluded to the 
idea of such a plot by presenting a plethora of evidence, then leaving it for the reader to 
reach the conclusion that Barzani was acting on his own accord or on behalf of a foreign 
entity. 
Similar to the sub-narrative analyzed in the last chapter, Kayhan tailored its 
discourse to its respective audience. Farsi berated the United States by invoking a ‘partition 
plot.’ As the Islamic regime constantly invokes foreign agents as a scapegoat when dealing 
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with domestic issues, it is not surprising that a regime publication like Kayhan would 
project such allegations onto foreign politics. As for English, it made Israel the focus of 
the ‘partition plot’ by including over a dozen pronouncements implying that Netanyahu 
was in cahoots with Barzani over partitioning Iraq rather than overtly implicating the 
United States as Farsi did. Considering the mixed support Netanyahu receives from the 
English speaking world over the Palestinian issue, focusing on Netanyahu in the Kurdish 
sub-narrative would be a much better way to persuade Anglophones to distrust Barzani and 















Chapter 4: Maliki, Abadi and the Iraqi Premiership, August 2014 
Kayhan paid close attention to contention surrounding the Iraqi prime ministership 
during the month of August. Following a lackluster Iraqi Security Forces response to the 
ISIS blitz into northern Iraq that many blamed on then Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, 
President Fuad Masum nominated Haider al-Abadi as the new prime minister. The 
incumbent Maliki, supported by his Dawa party, subsequently declared the nomination a 
violation of the constitution and brought the matter to federal court. Eventually, Maliki 
stepped down after over eight years as prime minister and amid international pressure, 
domestic protests, federal court rulings and allegations of foreign intrigue, Haider al-Abadi 
took over the position.  
 For its part, Farsi emphasized that Masum’s nomination violated the Iraqi 
constitution and that the United States’ was complicit in this violation. The publication did 
this, largely, by printing accusatory public statements made by Maliki and his supporters 
and directed at Masum and the United States. In addition, Farsi cited Iranian officials, as 
well as Maliki himself, who supported his continued tenure as prime minister. Similarly, 
English cited Iranian officials, but more so inasmuch as they supported the Iraqi 
constitution rather than Maliki. English also frequently cited Maliki, however, it reported 
more on his statements in favor of Iraqi law rather than on his statements supporting 
himself and accusing Masum of misdeeds. English reported support for Maliki, mostly by 
citing domestic Iraqi entities. Similar to Farsi, English reported on official statements made 
by Iranian officials, however, these supported Iraqi law rather than berated Masum. Both 
publications mentioned a ‘foreign plot’ aimed at upsetting the Iraqi government, although 
predictably, Farsi gave it much more in depth explanation than English. As with previous 
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chapters, I will address Farsi’s account first and then compare it with the one found in 
English.  
In the first half of August 2014, Farsi frequently covered public statements made 
by Maliki and his supporters in which he accused President Masum of violating the 
constitution and the United States of meddling in Iraqi domestic affairs. The following 
three examples illustrate this point. 
The first example, came on 5 August 2014 in a report in which Maliki’s 
parliamentary coalition declared that he would remain prime minister: “The State of Lawix 
coalition believes that the prime minister post belongs to Nouri al-Maliki and announced: 
‘People who speak of a transition from Maliki are, actually, violating the constitution and 
seek to hijack the rights of voters. The aforementioned coalition which Maliki chairs, won 
in the 30 April [2014 parliamentary] elections.’”103 In the next example, Maliki reportedly 
accused the United States of intrigue and Masum of violating the constitution:  
Nouri al-Maliki considers the President of Iraq’s selection of Haider Abadi as the 
 new prime minister a violation of the constitution and condemned American 
 meddling in Iraq’s internal affairs. . . . Maliki took a stance against Washington’s 
 support of al-Abadi, saying: ‘America has taken the side of someone who has 
 violated the constitution.’104 
  
The final example  appeared on  14 August 2014, in an article which covered Maliki’s most  
 
pointed   accusations,  while   reporting   political  tension  in  Iraq  following   the  Abadi  
 
nomination:  “Following  this decision [the Abadi nomination],  Maliki reacted  by stating:  
 
‘The decision of the President is a violation of the constitution and holds no weight.’ Maliki 
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has also said that he would appeal to Iraq’s federal court.”105 In regard to Western  
 
interference, the article stated:  
Maliki had considered the United States a partner in Masum’s constitutional 
 violation. Immediately after Masum introduced al-Abadi as Prime Minister, White 
 House officials took Masum’s side, along with European and Australian 
 leaders.106  
 
And then in a seemingly sudden move Maliki withdrew his candidacy, on same day Farsi  
 
reported these fiery statements. 
By the time Farsi’s 16 August 2014 edition was released, Maliki was no longer a 
prime minister candidate and its tone had changed in regard to the situation surrounding 
the prime minister post. Up to this point, pressure on Maliki to step down had been reported 
as a ‘foreign plot’ vis a vis statements by Maliki and his supporters. Yet after he stepped 
down, Farsi considered Maliki’s surprise decision a ‘spoiler of foreign plots.’ How can an 
action reportedly favored by the West, in fact, be a foil to its own intrigues? A pair of 16 
August 2014 articles explained. Since these articles had so much to reveal about this 
remarkable change in sentiment, they will both be cited at length.  
The first article of interest, explained three evolutions of a foreign plot to destabilize 
Iraq, alleged to have been in the works since even before the contentious prime minister 
selection process:  
The election of Haider al-Abadi, a distinguished member of Maliki’s ‘State of
 Law’ coalition, without any interference by foreigners, showed that the political
 system of Iraq is capable of coming to an agreement in the most sensitive political 
 situation. And this agreement was reached, even as Iraq’s enemies expected the
 country to fail in solving their domestic disputes through internal, democratic
 cooperation; even as these enemies expected the discussion over the premiership to 
                                                 
          105 “Ayatollah sistaani az mardomeh ‘araagh khaast baraayeh hefzeh araamesh va etehaad 
tazaahoraat nakonad [Ayatollah Sistani Asks Iraqi’s Not to Protest for Sake of Peace and Unity],” Kayhan 
Farsi, August 13, 2014, page 12, accessed September 24, 2015, http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
          106 Ibid.  
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 degenerate into endless bloody conflict.107 
 
The article continued, by stating that the new prime minister would bring fresh energy that  
 
would  neutralize plots against  Iraq and the Shi’is.108  Further elaborating  on these foreign  
 
plots, the article went on:  
If one analyzes how America, England, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and some other 
 internal [Iraqi] political factions dealt with the Iraqi people, it’s clear that their [the 
 Iraqis] hands had been tied since before the parliamentary elections. Foreign 
 powers sought to sabotage the governmental system of Iraq - the result of diligent 
 effort by Shi’is, Sunnis and Kurds, of all political stripes - and replace it with 
 anarchy. At this point, foreign powers would have been able to use the resulting 
 instability in Iraqi markets for their own selfish benefit. Before the election they 
 tried to put their own forces to work at the ballot box, distributing billions of 
 dollars, and employed various media outlets and other entities in order to assure a 
 favorable election result. But larger religious and revolutionary forces were at work 
 in this election which foiled such [foreign] plots. Only a short time after the 
 parliamentary elections, these same foreign entities imposed a haphazard brand of 
 terrorism [ISIS] on Iraq in order to gain with violence and dissent what they could 
 not gain peacefully.109  
 
Explaining   the  final   failed  evolution   of   the  alleged  foreign   plot  against  the  Iraqi  
 
government, Farsi wrote:  
After the failed electioneering attempt and the disruption of the security situation,
 the enemy focused all of its attention on internal divisions in the Shi’i community
 in regard to the selection of a prime minister. They [foreign enemies] were sure
 that the Shi’i would not be able to overcome this obstacle peacefully; they were
 sure the situation would degenerate into violence. And since they were also sure
 that most Iraqi political, legal and security mechanisms were dependent on the
 [newly elected to parliament] Shi’i, who constitute nearly 60% of Iraqis, they were 
 sure that the failure of the Shi’i to select a prime minister would result in a collapse 
 of the new Iraqi government. They [foreign enemies] believed this collapse would 
 smooth the way for various foreign and internal plots and oppressions.110  
                                                 
          107 “Ghalebeyeh ‘araagh bar seh tote’eh dar chand maah [Iraq Foils Three Plots in a few Months],” 
Kayhan Farsi, August 16, 2014, page 2, accessed September 29, 2015, 
http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
          108 Ibid.  
          109 Ibid. 
          110 “Ghalebeyeh ‘araagh bar seh tote’eh dar chand maah [Iraq Foils Three Plots in a few Months].” 
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It  is  worth  remark  that the final  talking point  made in this article  –  that  foreign enemies  
 
seek to destroy the central government of Iraq – appeared in other reports on the premier  
 




The second pertinent 16 August 2014 article further explained Maliki’s sudden 
resignation. According to Farsi, the United States and its allies had aimed to use pressure 
on Maliki in order to divide the Iraqi government and illicit a security forces response 
which would have further destabilized Iraq. The resulting instability, according to Farsi, 
would have facilitated an ISIS takeover of the country, which is what the United States 
wanted all along. Thus Maliki’s resignation foiled the plot by using a sort of reverse 
psychology and doing exactly what ‘the enemies’ of Iraq allegedly wanted. In Farsi’s 
words:  
According to news reports, Maliki stunned Western, regional and internal enemies 
 with his Thursday decision to withdraw his candidacy for the Iraqi Premier; the
 American, English, French and Saudi governments recently took a strong stance
 against Maliki, blaming all of Iraq’s problems on him. But these countries never
 thought that Maliki’s sudden withdrawal of his candidacy would upset all of their
 plots. Westerners thought that not only would Maliki remain in power, but that he
 would bring military and security forces into the political arena for his own gain [in
 order to remain prime minister]. According to the plan that the United States and
 Saudi Arabia had in mind, this political division and strife in Baghdad would
 enable ISIS militants to advance on various fronts. . . . Americans counted on the
 spread of insecurity in Iraq to also affect Iran. For this reason, the enemies pointed 
 a hundred accusing fingers at Maliki and announced that he was the cause of the
 current insecurity and that he must not remain in power. However, Maliki recently 
 and suddenly announced his withdrawal which thwarted America’s plot. We’ll
 have to wait and see what new tricks the foreign and domestic enemies of Iraq have 
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 up their sleeve.111  
 
The first 16 August  2014article explained the how whereas the previous one explained the  
 
what. In summary,  Farsi reported  that the United  States and its allies  sought to  tear apart  
 
the  Iraqi  government  to  make  way  for  its  exploitation of  the country  by  scapegoating  
 
Maliki,  whom  they  predicted  would  misuse  the  security  forces  in  order  to  maintain   
 
power,  thereby weakening the Iraqi counter-ISIS effort and facilitating the takeover of Iraq  
 
by America’s own alleged proxy group, ISIS. 
And as suddenly as he resigned, Farsi dropped its August reporting on Maliki and 
Iraqi political transition. The extent to which Farsi changed its reporting on the Maliki and 
the premiership is remarkable; no other episode in the period under study saw such a shift 
in sentiment. These two articles, repackaged the entire sub-narrative in a single edition and 
then subsequently dropped reporting on it. One of the final instances in which Maliki was 
mentioned came almost two weeks after his resignation in a brief article summarizing a 
reported meeting between Maliki and the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad 
Zarif, in which he praised Maliki for his role in “fighting terrorism” during recent 
months.112   
          Compared to Farsi, the first difference found in English was that it focused on other 
people’s support of Maliki rather than his support of himself. The next few examples will 
chronicle English’s portrayal of Maliki’s supporters to include, respectively, the Iraqi 
people, the Supreme Court and the Iraqi parliament. 
                                                 
          111 “Maaleki beh naf’eh al ‘abaadi kenaar raft teereh fetnehgaraan beh sang khord [Maleki Withdrew 
in Favor of al-Abadi Saboteurs Thwarted],” Kayhan Farsi, August 16, 2014, page 12, accessed October 1, 
2015, http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication.  
          112 “Tajlileh zarif az maaleki [Zarif Praises Maliki],” Kayhan Farsi, August 25, 2014, page 3, 
accessed October 1, 2015, http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
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The first example comes on 11 August 2014, the day Haider al-Abadi was 
nominated to replace Maliki. English reported that Maliki’s supporters were demonstrating 
on his behalf: 
Al-Ibadi’s [Abadi] nomination came hours after al-Maliki deployed his elite 
 security forces in the streets of Baghdad, partially closed two main streets — 
 popular spots for pro and anti-government rallies — as hundreds of his supporters 
 took to the streets. ‘We are with you, al-Maliki,’ they shouted, waving posters of 
 the incumbent premier, singing and dancing.113 
  
The article continued, reporting on Maliki’s support amongst his political bloc and quoting  
 
his son-in-law:  “The nomination is illegal and a  breach of the constitution.  We will go to  
 
the federal court to object to the nomination.”114 
In support of Maliki, a 12 August 2014 article reported on the Iraqi Supreme court 
announcement declaring that his State of Law coalition was the largest in parliament as per 
the April parliamentary elections. In this regard, the article explained: “Under Iraq’s 
constitution, the country’s new President Fouad Masoum [sic] must ask Maliki to form a 
new government. Maliki’s State of Law Coalition won the majority of seats in April’s 
parliamentary elections. However, the coalition is under pressure to withdraw its support 
for Maliki and pick another candidate.”115 
English reported on 13 August 2014 that leaders within Maliki’s Dawa party, the 
largest party in the State of Law coalition, did not support Abadi’s nomination.116 With 
                                                 
          113 “Iraq in Turmoil Amid Dispute Over PM” Kayhan English, August 12, 2014, page 1, accessed 
October 3, 2015, http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
          114 Ibid. 
          115 “Iraqi Court Declares Maliki’s Coalition as Largest in Parl’t,” Kayhan English, August 12, 2014, 
page 7, accessed October 4, 2015, http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
          116 “Maliki’s Dawa Party Rejects New Iraqi PM,” Kayhan English, August 13, 2014, page 7, 
accessed October 4, 2015, http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
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such support from his party, the article reported that Maliki, “would not give in to pressure 
to drop his bid for a third term in office.”117  
The second difference in the publications’ reporting concerned coverage of 
Maliki’s public statements. Whereas Farsi highlighted Maliki’s accusations against 
Masum, English focused on statements regarding Iraqi law and legal matters surrounding 
Abadi’s selection. Unlike Farsi, English eschewed such criticisms: it neither accused 
Masum of treason nor of taking action at the behest of the United States. In English, Maliki 
was depicted as a supporter of the legal process who was wronged rather than as a firebrand 
who was cheated by intrigue. The following examples feature English articles on public 
statements reportedly made by Maliki. 
For example, on 7 August 2014, English reported: “Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki said his country’s political issues are an internal affair, and stressed that everyone 
should respect people’s constitutional rights and choice. ‘We must respect the 
constitutional merits that ensure the Iraqis’ choices,’ Maliki said in his weekly address.”118 
In another example, English quoted Maliki as he threatened legal action: “I will submit 
today an official complaint to the federal court against the president of the Republic for 
committing a clear constitutional violation.”119 
In regards to the official Iranian regime position, English reporting was essentially 
the same as Farsi. Both publications reported on officials in favor of the Iraqi political 
process. For example on 13 August 2014, English further reported that Iranian officials 
were in favor of Abadi’s nomination. The article cited the Supreme Leader’s 
Representative on the National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, who supported the 
                                                 
          117 “Maliki’s Dawa Party Rejects New Iraqi PM.” 
          118 “Iraqi PM Emphasizes Respect for Constitution,” Kayhan English, August 7, 2014, page 7, 
accessed October 3, 2015, http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
          119 Ibid.  
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nomination and Iraqi national unity in the face of external threats such as ISIL: “Shamkhani 
urged all Iraqi factions to unite behind the country’s newly nominated prime minister, 
highlighting Iranian concern over instability in Iraq as it faces ISIL insurgency extending 
close to Baghdad.”120 The article also mentioned Iran’s previous support of Maliki: “Iran 
has expressed support for Maliki throughout the battle against ISIS militants but has also 
called for national unity and said it would back the Baghdad parliament’s choice of prime 
minister.”121 Again quoting Shamkhani, a 16 August piece articulated support for Maliki’s 
resignation:  
A senior Iranian official [Shamkhani] on Friday hailed the democratic transition in 
 Iraq and reaffirmed Iran’s support for the establishment of sustainable security in 
 the Arab country. ‘The people and government of the Islamic Republic of Iran will 
 utilize every potential to support the establishment of security, the fight against 
 terrorism, and progress in Iraq.’122 
 
Similar to Farsi, English  ran a  pair of articles  elaborating on  the alleged Western  
 
position  against  Iran  after Maliki  stepped  down.  However, instead of  emphasizing  the  
 
agency  of  foreign  intrigue in  the Iraqi  political  situation, as  was  seen  in  Farsi, English  
 
accused the West of misunderstanding the Iranian official position:  
 
The official move on the part of Iran has proven all the skeptics in the West wrong, 
 particularly those who claim ‘Tehran doesn’t favor unity or an all-inclusive
 government in Iraq.’ Quite the opposite, Tehran supports the new steps taken
 toward the completion of such a political process in Iraq. That’s because the
 appointment of the new prime minister and formation of the new unity government 
 is based on Iraq’s constitution, guidelines of the highest religious authorities and
 national consensus.123  
                                                 
          120 “Iran Backs Iraqi Parliament’s Decision on PM,” Kayhan English, August 13, 2014, page 1, 
accessed October 4, 2015, http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
          121 Ibid. 
          122 “Iran Hails Iraq Transition,” Kayhan English, August 16, 2014, page 1, accessed October 4, 2015, 
http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 




In addition, the article defended Maliki and denigrated American foreign policy:  
As for the resumption of American military action in Iraq [the start of the coalition
 air campaign], well, it cannot disguise the overall disarray of U.S. policy in the
 region, especially in Iraq where the outgoing PM is wrongfully blamed for
 everything that has gone wrong. It is the new Iraqi government and not the United 
 States that possesses the capacity to reverse the ongoing situation. The new
 American air power might succeed in saving the lives of those at immediate risk,
 but it won’t redeem a record of failure that now extends over several decades. That 
 failure is definitive and indelible, and has nothing to do whatsoever with outgoing 
 PM Maliki and his administration.124 
 
In the second article, English addressed the all too familiar ‘partition plot,’ 
however, it gave a much abridged version compared to that elaborated in Farsi. English 
only briefly reported on the first of the three separate evolutions of the alleged plot 
discussed in Farsi. Quoting Ali Velayati, a strategic advisor close to the Supreme Leader, 
this English article described the ‘plot’ as an attempt by unspecified enemies to disrupt the 
April 2014 parliamentary elections: “Despite the intention of Iraq’s enemies to prevent the 
holding of elections and break up the country, all Sunni, Shia and Kurdish groups opposed 
this issue and finally elected a Sunni parliament speaker, a Kurd president and a prime 
minister, which was very important.”125 Aside from the fact that English reported this ‘plot’ 
as an attempt to disrupt elections, the publication had little else in common with Farsi’s 
lengthy, biting articles on the topic. 
CONCLUSION 
It is worth noting that neither publication criticized Maliki at any point during the 
period. Even considering how Farsi had initially reported on Maliki, its story was molded 
                                                 
          124  “For Iraq’s Unity.” 
          125 “Iran Hails Iraq Transition.” 
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so as to avoid criticizing him once he withdrew his candidacy. A pro-Maliki stance is clear 
throughout in both English and Farsi reporting, however, naturally each publication had a 
different approach. As we saw in previous chapters, Kayhan seems have to tailored its 
message to each respective audience.  
As for the English sub-narrative of this chapter, an Anglophone audience would not 
have found extensive articles detailing alleged ‘American plots’ to sabotage the Iraqi 
government palatable. But this audience may go along with the legal argument, like the 
one English presented in this sub-narrative. Comparably speaking, English speaking 
governments of the world pay more respect to the law, at least domestically, than those of 
the Farsi speaking world. With this in mind, the English sub-narrative’s legalistic approach 
read as an attempt to persuade English speakers to favor Maliki. A less detailed explanation 
of a ‘foreign plot’ and a de-emphasis on accusations of foreign intrigue are a result of this 
effort. 
Along the same lines, it comes as no surprise that Farsi would take an approach 
that blamed foreign entities for meddling in Iraqi affairs and presenting Maliki as a victim 
of intrigue, the odd 16 August 2014 turn around notwithstanding. Consistent with sub-
narratives analyzed in other chapters, allegations of foreign intrigue follow actions that 
Farsi does not agree with. A Farsi speaking readership would certainly be familiar with 
Farsi’s portrayal of the 2014 prime minister transition in Iraq, as scapegoating foreign 
entities has been staple of regime rhetoric since its inception. In addition, taking a legal 
approach to an issue such as political transition, such as what we saw in English, may have 
invited dissent among Iranians as the questioned the legal legitimacy of their own Islamic 
Republic. For this reason, Farsi approached the issue like many regime officials approach 
other issues of concern to the Islamic Republic – by blaming foreign entities.   
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
It is important to note that that both publications took the same general stance on 
all issues analyzed throughout the period of study. These stances include: ‘The Syrian 
elections were healthy (Chapter 2),’ ‘Barzani is a traitor (Chapter 3)’ and ‘Maliki was 
cheated/Western plots were thwarted (Chapter 4).’ This fact, in addition to the facts that 
both publications are administered by an individual representative of the Supreme Leader 
and that neither publication lists authors for its articles, allowed me to control for many 
variables that typically plague CDA research. I have demonstrated that each language 
edition approaches political sub-narratives differently according to which target audience 
it is addressing. The Farsi edition provided a more coherent approach to the issues analyzed 
than English. After discussing how each language edition addressed its target audience, I 
will discuss the significance of this finding for English and Farsi speaking audiences. 
Finally, I will explain what this may mean for the American and Iranian counter-ISIS 
effort.   
Unsurprisingly, the overarching theme of Supreme Leader Khamenei’s political 
rhetoric – hostility to the United States and opposition to its political goals – clearly 
manifested itself in the political positions Kayhan elected to support. In regard to Farsi’s 
approach, two tropes surfaced that underlie every political issue analyzed in the present 
research: 
1. “The United States creates division.” According to Farsi the end state goal of the 
United States, particularly within the so-called Shi’i countries of Iraq and Syria, is to 
weaken governments in order to partition and conquer the region. Farsi alleged that 
America uses ethnic and sectarian fault lines to disempower standing governments with 
the end state goal of partitioning countries in order to dominate them and exploit their 
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resources. This viewpoint is rooted in Khamenei’s rhetoric on Iran as the new target of 
American intrigues following the fall of the Soviet Union. In the view of the regime, 
creating division in countries allied to Iran is a convenient way for the United States to 
weaken Iran without standing up to it directly. Within the ISIS narrative analyzed in this 
research, Farsi accused America of creating division, specifically, by denying Assad’s 
victory in the 2014 presidential elections, by encouraging Barzani to disobey the Iraqi 
central government and by encouraging Masum to violate the constitution. All of these 
alleged actions were portrayed as a direct attack on the territorial unity of Iran’s allies Iraq 
and Syria.  
2. “The United States supports terrorism.” This trope permeated Farsi reporting 
during the period under study, especially the sub-narratives analyzed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
According to Farsi, the United States and its allies train, equip and support terrorist 
organizations, including ISIS, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, in order to weaken standing 
governments and subsequently divide and conquer countries under the pretext of fighting 
terrorism. According to Farsi, the utilization of terrorist proxies was the primary method 
by which the United States and its allies sought to create the ‘division’ described above - 
whether this was ethnic division, as in the Kurdish sub-narrative, or sectarian division, we 
saw in the Iraqi premiership sub-narrative. The idea that the United State sponsors 
terrorism is also reflected in public statements by Khamenei. 
In regard to English, the primary difference was not the positions it supported, but 
how it supported such positions. While it did utilize the aforementioned tropes to a limited 
extent, overall its approach was less coherent than Farsi. English used a variety of 
approaches, such as selectively defending due process or ignoring topics emphasized in 
Farsi, so as to make the publication more palatable to Anglophones. The more nuanced 
approaches taken by English would certainly resonate better with its target audience than 
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the conspiratorial positions frequently taken by Farsi, for example, that the United States 
supported ISIS at the same time it was conducting an expensive air campaign against the 
group. 
The English approach appeared to be a deliberate propaganda effort to persuade 
English speakers to the Iranian regime’s position. As mentioned before, English’s 
perspective on issues at no point varied from those viewpoints printed in Farsi did. And 
while English did not have specific talking points that it stuck to across a spectrum of 
political issues, like Farsi, all articles printed in English strictly adhered to whatever set of 
specific talking points selected for each respective sub-narrative. English also appeared to 
make a conscious effort to build rapport with its audience, for example, by covering issues 
of no relevance to a Farsi speaking audience such as the American professional basketball 
championship series. Finally, both publications failed to meet what many would consider 
sound journalistic practices. For example, neither presented an article articulating an 
opposing viewpoint on any issue analyzed during the period. In addition, both editions 
contained frequent typos, failed to list authors for almost all articles published during the 
period of study and made blatantly ridiculous, unsourced claims. Regarding this last point, 
the previously cited Farsi claim that 2.5 million Iraqis mobilized almost immediately to 
fight ISIS comes to mind.126 
So why did English bother trying to persuade its target audience to the regime’s 
position? I believe the purpose was twofold. First, enmity with the United States has served 
to legitimize the reactionary Iranian regime since the advent of the Islamic Revolution. 
Maintaining the idea of foreign enemies, real or imagined, has always justified Islamic 
regime policy. In the spirit of maintaining this enmity, any form of opposition to American 
                                                 
          126 “Pishraviyeh artesh dar shomaaleh araagh baraayeh paaksaaziyeh kaameleh ostaaneh salaahuddin 
[Iraqi Army Advances Towards Complete Clearance of Salah Ad-Din Province in Northern Iraq].” 
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policy in the Middle East is in the interest of the regime. This opposition is expressed in 
variety of ways, to include persuading English speakers worldwide using media outlets 
such as English in an attempt to leverage Anglophone governments. Secondly, throughout 
the period under study, Iran was engaged in the seemingly contradictory efforts of 
providing military assistance and advice to one of its closest regional allies, the Assad 
regime, while at the same time conducting sensitive nuclear negotiations aimed at relieving 
economic sanctions.*0Successfully convincing Anglophones that the United States has 
nefarious goals in the Middle East would not only distract this audience from reports of the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) malign activities in the region - in direct 
violation of then existing United Nations Security Council sanctions - but could pressure 
this audience to further question the legitimacy of the Western sanctions regimen. 
Following the spectacular 13 November 2015 ISIS attacks in Paris, Western leaders 
have begun to re-evaluate their counter-ISIS efforts. Meanwhile, Iranian regime leadership 
has quietly increased IRGC military assistance in Iraq and Syria to unprecedented levels. 
This seemingly laudable Iranian effort, however, has been tainted with reports of atrocities 
by IRGC-affiliated Shi’i elements; most recently, a 20 September Human Rights Watch 
report documenting “enforced disappearances” and large scale property destruction carried 
out by Shi’i militias against Sunni persons following the recapture of Tikrit from ISIS in 
March-April 2015.127 Mounting evidence seems to indicate that the Islamic Republic’s 
                                                 
          *The 15 July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) had not yet been passed during the 
period under analysis. At the time of writing, the JCPoA appears to have improved Iran’s international 
legitimacy despite continued accusations of domestic human rights abuses leveled against Iran by the 
United Nations and growing concern over the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ ever increasing support 
of the Assad regime in Syria, Shi’i militias in Iraq, an insurgency in Yemen and the United States Treasury 
designated terrorist organization Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although articles regarding the nuclear talks not 
included in the corpus, as stated in the introduction, they were frequent and openly critical of the West and 
sanctions.             
          127“Ruinous Aftermath Militias Abuses Following Iraq’s Recapture of Tikrit,” Human Rights Watch, 
20 September, 2014, accessed 6 November, 2015. https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/20/ruinous-
aftermath/militias-abuses-following-iraqs-recapture-tikrit. 
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counter-ISIS efforts may have more to do with power projection and less to do with 
defeating the Islamic State. Reports such as a Long War Journal piece citing an influential 
IRGC Qod’s force affiliated Iraqi Shi’i militia leader who articulated his enmity to the 
United States and stated that groups under his control would overthrow the Iraqi 
government with the Iranian Supreme Leader’s permission128 are particularly worrisome 
for Western governments currently considering an escalation of their military efforts 
against ISIS. With an emboldened, post-nuclear deal Iranian regime firmly entrenched in 
Iraq and Syria, any escalated involvement by the West in this conflict could lead to direct 
confrontation between IRGC affiliated Shi’i proxies and United States led counter-ISIS 
coalition forces. The IRGC’s history of targeting American military personnel during the 
2003-2011 occupation of Iraq, not to mention the Islamic Republic’s continued harsh anti-
Western rhetoric, has done little to assuage such fears. In addition, the United States has 
lost much of its already damaged credibility in the region due to ambiguous policy in 
regards to the Syrian conflict and its support of nuclear negotiations with Iran which 
culminated in the 15 July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) despite strong 
opposition by regional allies such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the Gulf States. 
These actions have have put the United States severely out of position in the event military 
intervention against ISIS is deemed necessary. Unless American political leadership is 
prepared for a potential face-off between American forces and IRGC-backed Iraqi Shi’i 
militias forces in Iraq and Syria.  
In regard to American and Iranian ground forces potentially operating on the same 
battlefields, the Iranian regime’s accusations that the United States sponsors and supports 
                                                 
          128 Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss, “Iraqi Shiite Militia Leader Says He Would Overthrow 
Government if Ordered by Iran’s Supreme Leader,” The Long War Journal, 12 November 2015, accessed 
22 November 2015. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/11/us-designated-terrorist-of-iraqi-
militia-reportedly-in-aleppo.php 
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ISIS are disconcerting. As the Iranian regime pursues the twin goals of battling ISIS and 
regional power projection under the guise of Shi’i Islam, an attack on American assets in 
the Middle East seems increasingly likely. Logically speaking, if Iran is battling ISIS which 
America allegedly created and currently supports, why wouldn’t regime forces also attack 
American assets in the region? Considering the IRGC’s willingness to target American 
forces during the 2003-2011 occupation of Iraq, American policy makers should take this 
threat seriously and plan accordingly.     
The biggest weakness of this study is its failure to address the popular reception 
and production process of the publications under study. As noted in Chapter 1, there many 
obstacles facing any researcher attempting to directly access the Iranian people and 
uncover the inner workings of Iranian regime-affiliated institutions. As CDA methodology 
continues to evolve, perhaps future researchers will develop a way to gather such data in a 















          i “The Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is responsible 
for extraterritorial operations, including terrorist operations. The IRGC Qods Force is the 
government of Iran’s primary foreign action arm for executing its policy of supporting 
terrorist organizations and extremist groups around the world.”  
[Qods Force. Global Security.Org. Retrieved 15 November, 2014. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/qods.htm] 
 
          ii Sistani appears to have issued this Fatwa by way of his representative in Karbala, 
Ayatollah Abdul Mahdi al-Karbalai, who announced it on his behalf at Friday prayer. 
This seems to be the norm for Sistani’s religious rulings, he does not personally issue 
statements in public.  
 
          iii Specifically, Sistani called for ‘jihadeh kafai / جهاد کفایی.’ This refers to a type of 
jihad in which only the number of persons needed to complete the jihad must participate. 
In this case, Sistani most likely means the jihad participation should be limited to Iraqis. 
 
          iv The term ‘niroohaaye mardomi / نیروهای مردمی,’ directly translated, means 
‘people’s forces.’ However, many currently refer to this conglomeration of Shi’i 
volunteer fighters as the ‘Popular Mobilization Force’ or ‘PMF.’ Currently, these Shi’i 
fighters receive heavy material support from Iran and have a high degree of military 
organization. However, during the immediate post-Fatwa period these ‘people’s forces’ 
did not possess much organization or sophistication. Therefore, I have chosen not to 
translate this term as ‘PMF’ for the duration of the study. 
 
          v The “Peshmerga” is a military organization subordinate to the Kurdish Regional 
Government in Iraq.  
 
          vi In Islamic Republic political parlance the “resistance front,” or “محور مقاومت / 
mehvareh moqaavemat,” refers to the effort of all oppressed Shi’i Muslims across the 
region to stand against their “oppressive” governments, which includes but is not limited 
to, any non-Shiite government in the Middle East. The Islamic Republic encourages these 
Shi’i and, when politically beneficial as in the case of Palestinians, Sunni Muslims to 
“resist” the oppressors which include, namely, Israel and its allies.    
 
          vii It is worth noting that English did not quote a single non-Kurdish Iraqi politician 
that supported any action taken by the KRG in the month of July. 
 
          viii As of the time of writing, October 2015, Kayhan continues to claim that the 
United States and Israeli created ISIS. 
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          ix I have chosen rendered the name of Maliki’s “ائتالف دولت قانون / ‘etelaafeh 
dowlateh ghanoon” parliamentary coalition as State of Law in order to remain consistent 
with how the term is rendered in English. The term is sometimes translated occasionally 



























Books and Articles: 
“300 More U.S. Troops Headed to Iraq.” CBS News, June 30, 2014. Accessed November 
 15, 2014. http://www.cbsnews.com. 
 
Akbari, Ali. “Amrika dar Araaq chi mikhaahad (What does America Want in Iraq)!?.” 
 Kayhan, August 14, 2014. Accessed November 15, 2014, 
 http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication.  
 
Barkho, Leon. News from the BBC, CCN, and Al-Jazeera: How the Three Broadcasters 
 Cover the Middle East. Cresskill: Hampton Press Inc, 2010. 
 
Buchta, Wilfried. Who Rules Iran: The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic. 
 Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000. 
 
Bush, George. “Text of President Bush's 2003 State of the Union Address.” The 




Carvalho, Anabela. “Media(ted) Discourse And Society.” Journalism Studies 9:2 (2008): 
 161-177. 
 
Cockburn, Patrick. The Jihadis Return: ISIS and the New Sunni Uprising. New York: OR  
 Books, 2014. 
 
Erdbrick, Thomas. “Iran Bars Social Media Again After a Day.” New York Times, 




Fars News Agency.“‘Marg bar Amrika’ Parchameh Hoviyatiyeh Maa ast [‘Death to 
 America’ is a Symbol of our Identity],” February, 10, 2013. Accessed November 
 13, 2014. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13921121001696. 
 
Flick, Uwe, von Kardorff, Ernst and Steinke, Ines. "What Is Qualitative Research? An 
 Introduction to the Field." In A Companion to Qualitative Research. Edited by 
 Flick, Uwe, von Kardorff, Ernst and Steinke, Ines. Translated by Jenner, Bryan. 
 London: Sage Publications, 2004: 3-11. 
 63 
 
Fürsich, Elfriede. “In Defense of Textual Analysis.” Journalism Studies, 10:2 (2009): 
 238-252. 
 
Ganji, Akbar. “Who Is Ali Khamenei? The Worldview of Iran’s Supreme Leader.” 




Ghasemi, Shapour. “Kayhan Newspaper.” Iran Chamber Society, 2006. Accessed 
 November 20, 2014. http://www.iranchamber.com/media/articles/kayhan_ 
 newspaper.php. 
 
Hartley, John. Understanding News. New York: Methuen & Co., 1982. 
 
Ignatius, David. “Iran’s Hard-Liners Resist Nuclear Deal.” The Washington Post, 17 
 December, 2013. Accessed November 13, 2014. 
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions. 
 
Inskeep, Steve. “Editor Upholds Ideology Of Iran's Islamic Revolution.” NPR, February 
 9, 2009. Accessed November 20, 2014. 
 http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100245745. 
 
“Interview Hussein Shariatmadari.” PBS, August 1, 2007. Accessed on November 20, 
 2014. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showdown/interviews/ 
 shariatmadari.html. 
 
“Iran Sent Soldiers to Fight in Iraq.” Al-Jazeera, August, 23, 2014. Accessed November 
 15, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com. 
 
“Iran blocks YouTube, Google over Mohammed Video.” CNN, September 24, 2012. 
 Accessed November 19, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/24/world/meast/iran- 
 youtube-blocked/index.html 
 
Kasmani, Mohd. “The BBC and Al Jazeera English: The Similarities and Differences in 
 the Discourse of the Pre-Election Coverage of the 2009 Iranian Electrion.” 
 International Journal of Communication, 7, 2013: 1718-1739. 
 




Kerry, John. “Interview With Katie Couric of Yahoo!” United States Department of 
 State, June 16, 2014. Accessed November 15, 2014.  
 http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/06/227624.htm.  
 
Kolmer, Christian, and Holli Semetko. "Framing the Iraq War: Perspectives from 
 American, U.K., Czech, German, South African, and Al-Jazeera News." 
 American Behavioral Scientist, 52:5, 2009: 643-56. 
 
Mayring, Philipp. "Qualitative Content Analysis.” In A Companion to Qualitative 
 Research. Edited by Flick, Uwe, von Kardorff, Ernst and Steinke, Ines. Translated 
 by Jenner, Bryan. London: Sage Publications, 2004: 266-269. 
 
Obama, Barack. “Remarks by the President on the Situation in Iraq.” The White House. 
 June 19, 2014. Accessed November 15, 2014. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the- 
 press-office/2014/06/19/remarks-president-situation-iraq. 
 
Philo, Greg. “Can Discourse Analysis Successfully Explain the Content of Media and 
 Journalistic Practice?” Journalism Studies, 8:2, 2007: 175-196. 
 
Powers, Samantha. “Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. 
 Permanent Representative to the United Nations, after Adoption of Security 
 Council Resolution 2170 on ISIL and the al-Nusrah Front in Iraq and Syria.” 
 United States Mission to the United Nations, August 15, 2014. Accessed 
 November 15, 2014. http://www.usun.state.gov. 
 
Reisigl, Martin and Wodak, Ruth. “The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA).” In 
 Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis 2nd edition, edited by Wodak, Ruth and 
 Meyer, Michael. London: SAGE, 2009. 
 
Roggio, Bill and Weiss, Caleb. “Iraqi Shiite Militia Leader Says He Would Overthrow 
 Government if Ordered by Iran’s Supreme Leader.” The Long War Journal, 12 
 November 2015. Accessed 22 November 2015. http://www.longwarjournal.org/ 
 archives/2015/11/us-designated-terrorist-of-iraqi-militia-reportedly-in-aleppo.php 
 
“Ruinous Aftermath Militias Abuses Following Iraq’s Recapture of Tikrit,” Human 




Richardson, John E. Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse 
 Analysis. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007. 
 
 65 
Sadjadpour, Karim. Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran’s Most Powerful 
 Leader. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2009. 
 
Sadri-Afshar, Gholamhussein, Hokmi, Nasrin and Hokmi Nastaran. Farhangeh 
 Mo’asereh Farsi: Viraasteh Jadid [Contemporary Persian Dictionary: New 
 Edition]. Tehran: Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, 2002. 
 
Scales, Robert. “The Pentagon’s ‘Nine Brigade Gamble’ on Iraq.” The Washington Post, 
 November 10, 2014. Accessed November 15, 2014. 
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions. 
 
Schiffrin, Deborah. Approaches to Discourse. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1994. 
 
Schmitt, Eric and Gordon, Michael. “U.S. Sees Risks in Assisting a Compromised Iraqi 
 Force.” The New York Times, July 13, 2014.  Accessed November 15, 2014. 
 http://www.nytimes.com 
 
Slackman, Michael. “Freed by Revolution, He Speaks for Iran’s Hard-Liners.” New York 
 Times, September 22, 2007. Accessed November 20, 2014 
 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/22/world/middleeast/22shariamadari.html 
 
Smith, Jeffery. “Hussein's Prewar Ties To Al-Qaeda Discounted.” The Washington Post, 
 April 6, 2007. Accessed November 16, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com. 
 
Tomlinson, Hugh. “Iran’s Special Forces Rush in to Help Floundering Ally.” The Times, 
 June 12, 2014. Accessed November 15, 2014. http://www.thetimes.co.uk. 
 
Tyrwhitt-Drake, Hugh. "Resisting the Discourse of Critical Discourse Analysis: 
 Reopening a Hong Kong Case Study." Journal of Pragmatics, 31:8, 1999: 1081 
 1088 “U.S. Deaths in Iraq Reach 3,000.” CNN, January 3, 2007. Accessed 
 November 16, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/01/01/ 
 iraq.deathtoll/index.html. 
 
Wodak, Ruth and Meyer, Michael. “Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, 
 Theory and Methodology.” In Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis 2nd edition, 
 edited by Wodak, Ruth and Meyer, Michael. London: SAGE, 2009. 
 
Zeng, Li, and Khalaf Tahat. "Picturing Terrorism through Arabic Lenses: A Comparative 
 Analysis of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya." Asian Journal of Communication, 22:5, 






“Amir-abdollahian: iraan ejaazeh nemidehad araaq tajziyeh beshavad [Amir 
 Abdollahian: Iran Will Not Allow Iraq to be Partitioned].” Kayhan Farsi, July 7, 
 2014 page 2. Accessed July 28, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Aamrika aameleh naa-amni dar Araaq ast [America is Responsible for Lack of 
 Safety in Iraq],” Kayhan Farsi, 17 June, 2014, page 2. Accessed April 4, 2015. 
 http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Aamrikaa az gozashteh za’iftar va manfoortar shodeh ast [America has Become Weaker 
 and More Hated than Before].” Kayhan Farsi, August 16, 2014, page 3. Accessed 
 October 1, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Atasheh sangeeneh artesh va mardomeh araagh bar sareh da’esh [Military and People of 
 Iraq Bring Heavy Fire to Bear on ISIS].” Kayhan Farsi, June 15, 2014, page 12. 
 Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
 
“Ayatollah sistaani az mardomeh ‘araagh khaast baraayeh hefzeh araamesh va etehaad 
 tazaahoraat nakonad [Ayatollah Sistani Asks Iraqi’s Not to Protest for Sake of 
 Peace and Unity].” Kayhan Farsi, August 13, 2014, page 12. Accessed September 
 24, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Ayatollah qazvini dar karbala lebsaseh razm pooshid [Ayatollah Qazvini Dons Combat 
 Fatigues in Karbala].” Kayhan Farsi, June 15, 2014, page 3. Accessed April 4, 
 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Azaadsaazi va paaksaaziyeh mantagheh beh mantagheh dar araagh [Liberation and 
 Clearing in Iraq, Sector by Sector].” Kayhan Farsi, June 18, 2014, page 12. 
 Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
 “Baseejeh saraasari dar araagh baraayeh moghabeleh baa teroristhaayeh da’esh 
 [Mobilization Across Iraq in the Fight Against ISIS Terrorists].” Kayhan Farsi, 




“Darkhaasteh shoraayeh amniyat az jome’eyeh jahaani baraayeh sarkoobeh daa’esh dar 
 ‘araagh [Security Councils Asks the World to Stamp Out ISIS].” Kayhan Farsi, 
 August 9, 2014, page 12. Accessed September 24, 2015. 
 http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication.   
 
“Devist o si namaayandeyeh majles pirooziyeh bashar assad raa tabrik goftand [230 
 Congressional Representatives Give Congratulations For Bashar Assad Victory]”, 
 Kayhan Farsi, June 9, 2014, page 10, accessed April 4, 2015, 
 http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Edameye tasfieyeh afsaaraneh kha’en hamzamaan baa piroozihaayeh taazeyeh artesheh 
 araagh [Traitorous Officers Continue to be Purged as Iraqi Army Achieves Fresh 
 Victories].” Kayhan Farsi, June 19, 2014, page 12. Accessed April 4, 2015. 
 http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Ejaazeh nemidahim teroristhaa, amniat va sobaateh araagh raa beh ham bezanand [We 
 Will Not Allow Terrorists to Disrupt Iraq’s Stability and Security].” Kayhan 
 Farsi, June 14, 2014, page 10. Accessed April 4, 2015. 
 http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Entekhabaateh suriyeh paiyaameh eghtedaareh iraan beh jahaan bood [Syrian Election 
 was a Message of Iranian Supremacy to the World].” Kayhan Farsi, June 8, 2014, 
 page 12. Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“E’zaameh daavtalabaaneh tazeh nafas karbala baraayeh paaksaaziyeh kaameleh shahreh 
 tikrit [Fresh Volunteers from Karbala Sent to Clear City of Tikrit].” Kayhan 
 Farsi, July 10, 2014, page 12. Accessed August 4, 2015. 
 http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Fazaasaaziyeh jaryaanhaayeh gharbgaraa baraayeh takhribeh ravandeh siaasiyeh Araaq 
 [West-Leaning Political Factions Set Stage for the Sabotage of Iraqi Political 
 Process],” Kayhan Farsi, 1 July, 2014, page 12. Accessed July 26, 2014. 
 http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Ghalebeyeh ‘araagh bar seh tote’eh dar chand maah [Iraq Foils Three Plots in a few 
 Months].” Kayhan Farsi, August 16, 2014, page 2. Accessed September 29, 2015. 
 http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Halaakateh 280 teroristeh ejaarei dar amaliaateh moshtarakeh artesh va mardomeh 
 Araaq [280 Terrorist Mercenaries Killed in Joint Iraqi Military-Militia 
 Operation].” Kayhan Farsi, 5 July, 2014, page 12. Accessed July 26, 2015. 
 http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication.     
 68 
 
“Havadeseh araaq fetnehye amrikai ast nah Jangeh shi’eh va sonni [Events in Iraq are 
 American Disruptions Not Shia-Sunni War].” Kayhan Farsi, June 23, 2014, page 
 3. Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Hefz tamaamiyateh arziyeh Araaq moredeh ta’kideh Iraan ast [Iran Stresses Preservation 
 of Iraq’s Territorial Integrity].” Kayhan Farsi, 1 July, 2014, page 10. Accessed 
 July 26, 2014. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication.    
 
“Jomhuriyeh eslami, amrika raa dar mantagheh beh zaanu dar aavordeh ast [The Islamic 
 Republic Has Brought America to its Knees within the Region].” Kayhan Farsi, 
 June 8, 2014, page 3. Accessed April 4, 2015. 
 http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Kaalbod shekaafiyeh teroristhaayeh daa’esh [Investigating ISIS Terrorists].” Kayhan 
 Farsi, June 19, 2014, page 8. Accessed April 4, 2015, 
 http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Khaawbeh sahyunisthaa baraayeh kordistaneh ‘araaq [The Zionists’ Dream for Kurdish 
 Iraq].” Kayhan Farsi, July 12, 2014, page 2. Accessed August 4, 2015. 
 http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Maleki beh naf’eh al ‘abaadi kenaar raft teereh fetnehgaraan beh sang khord [Maleki 
 Withdrew in Favor of al-Abadi Saboteurs Thwarted].” Kayhan Farsi, August 16, 
 2014, page 12. Accessed October 1, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Maleki: bohraneh konuni ‘araagh yek tote’eyeh mantaghei ast [Maliki: Iraq’s Current 
 Crisis is a Regional Conspiracy].” Kayhan Farsi, June 19, 2014, page 12. 
 Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Maleki nokhost vazireh aatiyeh ‘araagh [Maliki the Future Prime Minister of Iraq].” 
 Kayhan Farsi, August 5, 2014, page 12. Accessed September 24, 2015. 
 http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication.   
 
“Maleki vaziraaneh kord raa az kaabineyeh ‘araaq ekhraaj kard [Maliki Throws Kurdish 
 Ministers out of Iraqi Cabinet].” Kayhan Farsi, July 12, 2014, page 12. Accessed 
 August 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Mardomeh araaq hergez beh tajzieyeh keshvarehshoon tan nakhaahad daad [The Iraqi 
 People Will Never Concede to Partition of Their Country].” Kayhan Farsi, July 6, 
 2014, page 2. Accessed July 26, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication.  
 69 
 
“Mardomeh suriyeh emrooz ra’iseh jomhureh aayandeh raa entekhab mikonand [Syrian 
 People Choose Their Next President Today].” Kayhan Farsi, April 4, 2015, page 
 12. Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Mazdooraaneh gharb ba’ad az een entekhabaat tavaaneh khod raa az dast midehand 
 [Western Mercenaries Lose Power After These Elections].” Kayhan Farsi, June 7, 
 2014, page 10. Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Nabardeh sangeen baa kofaareh da’esh 2 miliyon araaghi sabtehnaam kardand [Two 
 Million Iraqis Join Intense Battle Against ISIS Infidels].” Kayhan Farsi, June 22, 
 2014, page 12. Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Paiyamhaayeh entekhabaateh suriyeh [The Messages of the Syrian Elections].” Kayhan 
 Farsi, June 12, 2014, page 6. Accessed April 4, 2015. 
 http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Paazeleh bohraneh araaq [The Puzzle of the Iraq Crisis].” Kayhan Farsi, July 10, 2014, 
 page 8. Accessed July 30, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Pishraviyeh artesh dar shomaaleh araagh baraayeh paaksaaziyeh kaameleh ostaaneh 
 salaahuddin [Iraqi Army Advances Towards Complete Clearance of Salah Ad-
 Din Province in Northern Iraq].” Kayhan Farsi, June 23, 2014, page 12. Accessed
 April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Raaheh haleh bohraneh suriyeh az sandooq ra’i migozarad [Solution to Syrian Crisis 
 Rests in Ballot Box].” Kayhan Farsi, June 2, 2014, page 3. Accessed April 4, 
 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Sarkubeh da’esh dar araagh shaaheh sa’udi raa beh haraas andakht [Suppression of ISIS 
 in Iraq Frightens Saudi King].” Kayhan Farsi, June 28, 2014, page 12. Accessed 
 April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Rowhani beh assad tabrik goft [Rouhani Congratulated Assad].” Kayhan Farsi, June 9, 
 2014, page 10. Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Tadabir shadideh amniatiyeh artesh suriyeh dar aastaaneyeh bargozaariyeh 
 entekhabaateh riaasateh jomhuri [Intense Syrian Military Security Planning on the 
 Eve of Presidential Elections].” Kayhan Farsi, June 2, 2014, page 12. Accessed 
 April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
 70 
“Tajlileh zarif az maaleki [Zarif Praises Maliki].” Kayhan Farsi, August 25, 2014, page 
 3. Accessed October 1, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Tavvahom az no’eh daa’eshi [The ISIS Fantasy].” Kayhan Farsi, 3 July, 2014, page 2. 
 Accessed July 26, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication.   
 
“Vaakonesheh maaleki va yaaraanesh beh entesaabeh nakhost vazireh jadideh ‘araagh 
 [Reactions by Maliki and his Supporters to the New Nomination for Iraqi 
 Premiership].” Kayhan Farsi, August 13, 2014, page 12. Accessed September 24, 
 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/fa/publication. 
 
“Zarabaateh sangeen beh da’esh terroristhaa paa beh faraar gozaashtand [Heavy Blows 
 Cause ISIS Terrorists to Flee].” Kayhan Farsi, June 16, 2014, page 12. Accessed 





“For Iraq’s Unity.” Kayhan English, August 14, 2014, page 2. Accessed October 4, 2015. 
 http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Friends of Syria Back Elections.” Kayhan English, June 2, 2014, page 1. Accessed April 
 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Hunting Maliki.” Kayhan English, August 17, 2014, page 2. Accessed October 10, 
 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Iran Backs Iraqi Parliament’s Decision on PM.” Kayhan English, August 13, 2014, page 
 1. Accessed October 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Iran Hails Iraq Transition.” Kayhan English, August 16, 2014, page 1. Accessed 
 October 4, 2015, http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Iran MPs: Syria Election Foiled Plots.” Kayhan English, June 9, 2014, page 1. Accessed 
 April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Iraq Set to Launch Offensive Against ISIL Terrorists.” Kayhan English, June 15, 2014, 
 page 8. Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
 71 
“Iran to Respect Iraq’s Choice for PM.” Kayhan English, July 7, 2014, page 7. Accessed 
 September 1, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Iraq in Turmoil Amid Dispute Over PM.” Kayhan English, August 12, 2014, page 7. 
 Accessed October 3, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Iraq PM Accuses Kurds of Hosting Terrorists.” Kayhan English, July 10, 2014, page 8. 
 Accessed September 3, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Iraq PM Won’t Quit ‘Without Court Ruling’.” Kayhan English, August 14, 2014, page 
 7. Accessed October 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Iraqi Court Declares Maliki’s Coalition as Largest in Parl’t.” Kayhan English, August 
 12, 2014, page 7. Accessed October 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Iraqi Kurdistan Oil Reaches Texas.” Kayhan English, July 28, 2014, page 7. Accessed 
 September 1, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Iraqi Kurds Welcome Netanyahu Support.” Kayhan English, July 1, 2014, page 8. 
 Accessed August 26, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Iraqi PM Emphasizes Respect for Constitution.” Kayhan English, August 7, 2014, page 
 7. Accessed October 3, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“ISIL Terrorists Kidnap 100 Foreign Nationals in Iraq.” Kayhan English, June 19, 2014, 
 page 7. Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“KRG President Accused of ‘Treason’ Against Iraq.” Kayhan English, July 6 2014, page 
 7. Accessed August 26, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Leader’s Aide Hails Unity Government in Iraq.” Kayhan English, August 17, 2014, 
 page 2. Accessed October 10, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Maliki’s Dawa Party Rejects New Iraqi PM.” Kayhan English, August 13, 2014, page 7. 
 Accessed October 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“The Nightmare of Takfiri Caliphate.” Kayhan English, July 2, 2014, page 2. Accessed 
 August 26, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“No Need to West to Endorse Election Legitimacy.” Kayhan English, June 8, 2014, page 
 8. Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 72 
 
“No Plan to Send Troops to Iraq.” Kayhan English, July 2, 2014, page 1. Accessed 
 August 26, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Parade Held in Baghdad in Support of Iraqi Army.” Kayhan English, June 22, 2014, 
 page 8. Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Qom Seminary Backs Ayatollah Sistani’s Fatwa.” Kayhan English, June 25, 2014, page 
 2. Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Repeating Failed Policies in Iraq.” Kayhan English, June 14, 2014, page 2. Accessed 
 April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Terrorist Mortar Attacks on Aleppo Kill 20.” Kayhan English, June 1, 2014, page 1. 
 Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication.  
 
“Time to Wipe Out Terrorists from Iraq.” Kayhan English, June 18, 2014, page 4. 
 Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Turkey Does Not Want to See Divided Iraq.” Kayhan English, July 2, 2014, page 7. 
 Accessed September 1, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“UN Lauds PM Maliki for Relinquishing Power in Iraq.” Kayhan English, August 16, 
 2014, page 8. Accessed October 10, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“US Using Kurdish State as Weapon Against Iraq.” Kayhan English, July 14, 2014, page 
 7. Accessed September 3, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
 
“Zionists Spurring Iraqi Kurd Sedition.” Kayhan English, July 3, 2014, page 1. Accessed 
August 26, 2015. http://www.kayhan.ir/en/publication. 
